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5INTRODUCTION
European Union has in recent years been hit by multiple problems. Global financial
crisis  of 2008 led to serious economic difficulties in several member-states,  causing
Euro crisis as a result. The migration crisis of 2015 demonstrated incapability of the
member-states  of  concerted action in case of  mass  influx of refugees  and migrants,
reinforcing anti-immigration stances in several member-states.
These  events  have  had serious  political  repercussions,  especially  if  compounded by
economic difficulties, social tensions and power struggles in the level of nation states.
The future of European integration seems to be at stake, as the popularity of Eurosceptic
political forces is on the rise both on the Left (mostly in Southern Europe) and on the
Right of the political  spectrum. As the referendum on leaving from the EU, held in
Great Britain on June 2016, amply demonstrated, the results may be momentous. This
has  led  to  growing public  interest  towards  the  question  of  to  what  extent  common
identity can bind European nations together and facilitate further integration.
In recent  years,  notable changes  have taken place also in  the political  landscape of
Central and Eastern Europe. Even though in most post-communist countries a strong
majority of the population still support membership of the EU, „soft” Euroscepticism is
gaining  ground  also  there.  Importantly,  the  European  and  domestic  crisis  in  this
particular region seem to translate into problems with the quality of democracy.Indeed,
relations  between  the  Union  and  especially  Poland  and  Hungary  have  severely
worsened after allegations that Poland and Hungary have been moving away from the
6principles of liberal democracy and rule of law. Also, anti-refugee attitudes of the ruling
parties  and  their  reluctance  to  accept  so-called  quota  refugees  have  added  to  the
tensions. As the current governments have gained remarkable public support especially
due to their welfare policies and securitizing the immigration issue, they may be capable
to legitimize also their understanding of Europeanness and European integration among
the voters. It has major implications for the future of the whole Union. Recently there
has  been  indeed  rise  of  academic  interest  towards  the  opportunities  to  tackle  the
democratic backsliding in the Eastern member-states of the European Union, but there
is still lack of in-depth empirical studies. (Kelemen and Blauberger 2017) Furthermore,
no  attention  at  all  has  yet  been  payed  to  the  question  about  the  effects  of  the
confrontation with the European Union  in respective countries. The objective of this
study is to fill up the lacuna. In turn, Poland deserves special attention in the region not
only because of its size, but also as “a country still undergoing a profound indentity
crisis, resulting in deep elite divisions” between liberal and conservative camps. (Risse
2010, 65)
Profound changes in the EU-Polish relations have created demand for new meanings
and explanations.  The aim of this  study is  to  investigate  how being European is  in
rapidly  changing  environment  interpreted  by  various  right-wing circles  of  Poland –
more specifically by the actors who are trying to form and influence public opinion
(politicians,  activists,  journalist,  public  intellectuals  etc.).  But  the  study  may  also
contribute to the theoretical debate about the European identity,  as it  deals with the
applicability  of these theories in the particular  contexts of post-communist  member-
states and recent developments of the history of European integration.
The rule of law controversy
Since the accession of the Poland into the European Union, two main political forces
there have waged remarkably different politics in the direction of the European Union.
Governments led by Civic Platform (PO) have emphasized its pro-European credentials
7and  prioritized  good  relations  with  Germany  and  other  Western  European  powers
(O'Neal 2017, 36). The victory of Law and Justice party (PiS) in parliamentary and
presidential elections of 2015 have however brought considerable change also in the
realm  of  foreign  policy.  While  avoiding  disintegration  of  the  European  Union  is
declared by the  new government  to  be in  the interests  of  Poland,  deepening of  the
integration is also consistently opposed. The appeals of Poland to give the EU more
intergovernmental character have not received favorable reception among most of the
other member-states. (Bieńczyk-Missala 2017, 224)
While being clearly more lukewarm in its attitudes towards European Union, the PiS
government  has  attempted  to  avoid  major  deterioration  of  the  relations  with  major
member states and the supranational institutions of the EU. Even so, several internal
political  decisions  have  considerably  tarnished  Polish  image  abroad  and  also
deteriorated  its  relations  with  major  western  powers.  Besides  nationalist  memory
political initiatives especially attempts to curb the independence of judiciary and public
media are cases in point, leading to the fears that future of Polish democracy may be
under threat. (Bieńczyk-Missala 2018, 281-282)
Especially much attention has been payed to the attempts of the government to take the
control over the Constitutional Tribunal, which notably led to the reaction of the EU
Commission who, using its recently adopted rule of law framework, has first time in the
history proposed to trigger the Article 7 procedure of the European Union Treaty. The
controversy over the Tribunal began already before the 2015 elections. Parliamentary
majority controlled by PO-led government had on their way out right to elect three new
judges to the Constitutional Tribunal as the term of their predecessors expired before the
general  elections.  But  additionally  two  more  judges  were  elected,  even  though
according to the Law on Constitutional Tribunal it should have been the prerogative of
the next parliament. In order to do it, the law was hastily amended. However, recently
elected  PiS-affiliated  president  Andrzej  Duda  refused  to  swear  in  none  of  the  five
elected judges. As the PiS gained parliamentary majority after the elections, they elected
8five judges of their own. Constitutional Tribunal ruled on December 3, 2017 that even
though two judges of the PO were illegally elected, three others should have been sworn
in by Duda. However, the president refused to publish the ruling and swore in all five
judges elected by PiS instead. Standoff between the government and the Constitutional
Tribunal followed, with the Tribunal refusing to seat the judges appointed by PiS.  The
government in turn retaliated with adopting several new laws which aimed to restrict the
opportunities of the Tribunal to operate effectively. The resistance of the Tribunal was
broken down in December 2016 when the term of its president Andrzej Rzepliński came
to an end.  Since  then  the  court  has  been manned by pro-government  judges,  using
various  dubious  legal  tricks.  So  it  has  become  effectively  subordinated  to  the
government. (Kovács, Scheppele 2017, 154-155)
The Constitutional Tribunal crisis provoked mass demonstrations in support of the rule
of law and Constitutional Tribunal. (O'Neal 2017, 33) Besides that it attracted from the
very beginning the interest of foreign media and political actors. Already in December
2015 the European Commission appealed for the Polish government to wait the ruling
of  the  Venice  Commission  before  enacting  controversial  new  legislation  on
Constitutional Tribunal. After this appeal was ignored, the Commission invoked its Rule
of Law framework in January 2016. (Kovács, Scheppele 2018, 194-195)
The framework, dating back to 2014, was adopted as a reaction of perceived problems
with the rule of law in some member states, notably Hungary and Romania. It involves
three  stages.  In  the  first  step,  the  European  Commission  investigates  the  possible
“systemic threat” to the rule of law in a member state. If it is found to be the case, “rule
of law opinion” is published, to which the member state may respond. In the second
step, the Commission proposes measures to address the problems by means of issuing
'rule  of  law  recommendation'.  If  the  problems  are  not  solved  for  predetermined
deadline, the Commission may propose the European Council to launch the Article 7 of
Treaty  of  the  European  Union  (TEU).  (Sedelmeier  2017,  345)  It  stipulates  that  a
member-state may be suspended some of its rights, including possibly voting rights in
9the Council,  if  systematic  breach of the founding principles of the EU1 is  detected.
However, not only the consent of the European Parliament, but also unanimity of the
European Council members is needed to start the procedure in the first place. (TEU
2007)
As  Poland  failed  to  reach  agreement  with  the  European  Commission  regarding  the
violations of rule of law, the 'opinion' was issued by the Commission in June 2016 and
the 'recommendation' in July 2016. The violations were also repeatedly denounced by
the European Parliament and Venice Commission.  As no concessions were made by
Polish side, the European Commission issued the reasoned proposal on December 17,
2017,  recommending  the  European  Council  to  trigger  the  Article  7  against  Poland.
(Kovács,  Scheppele  2017,  196-197)  However,  at  that  time  it  was  clear  that  Poland
would not face any serious sanctions as it is virtually impossible to get the approval of
the European Council for that. Also has the European Union been reluctant to find any
other means to exert pressure on Poland in order to fix the problems of rule of law.
(Sedelmeier 2017, 348-349)
Meanwhile attempts have been made to subordinate also the rest of the judicial system
to the government. Especially reforms of Supreme Court have evoked public attention
both home and abroad in that respect. Even though the government has occasionally
also backed down in some details due to pressure from the side of civil society and the
European Union (BBC 2018; Kovács, Scheppele 2018, 196), the process is basically
still continuing.Research aim and research questions
As the aforementioned Article 7 procedure has been unprecedented in the history of
European Union, Poland is a “unique case” for investigation of the implications of a
confrontation between a member state and supranational institutions of the EU.2 (cf. Yin
1 These values are enumerated in the Article 2 of the TEU as follows: “respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities.“
2 In September 2018 European Parliament also voted for triggering the procedure against Hungary, but 
it is still in its infancy. A somewhat comparable confrontation has occurred only once before, namely 
in the case of Austria after the representatives of far-right Freedom Party were admitted into 
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2009, 47) Such a study may add valuable insights to the theory of European identity. It
seems plausible that if open conflict with Brussels escalates, attitudes in a member-state
towards the EU may change significantly. It may well lead to “a critical juncture” where
established ideas  about  belonging to  Europe would  lose  their  appeal  and new ones
would emerge.
If  identities  are  usually  sticky,  as  the  historical  institutionalists  claim,  the  new
understanding of national and European identities would seal the fate of the nation for a
long  time.  So  studying  Polish  case  closely  would  also  have  a  significant  practical
importance.  It  may  be  even  more  salient  as  rather  similar  issues  are  also  creating
tensions between the EU and other member-states, notably Hungary and Romania.
It  is  important to investigate change in both European identity narratives in Poland.
However, it may assumed that liberal discourse is less liable to change as confrontation
with the EU institution may be easily interpreted in terms of existing identity narratives.
Launching the rule of law procedure is however presumably inconsistent with the view
held by the rightist  Poles that despite being in many important ways different from
Western Europe, Poland can still be influential and respected member of the EU. As
existing  rightist  discourse  about  how  being  Polish  can  be  consistent  with  being
European  seems  to  be  explicitly  rejected  by  fellow  Europeans,  need  for  new
explanations  may  emerge.  Therefore  it  seems  more  urgent  to  investigate  possible
identity change on the right side of political spectrum. This is the subject of this study,
with research questions related to the salience of European identity in the coverage of
the rule of law crisis, portrayal of Europeanness and possible changes of it.
Overview of the thesis
The thesis proceeds as follows. In the first chapter, literature overview and theoretical
foundations of the study are introduced. Especially this study draws on Thomas Risse's
ideas about Europeanization of national identities and the possiblity of identity change.
One of his main arguments is that European identities are formed differently in different
government, see Merlinger et al. 2001.
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national contexts. In critical junctures identity may change if new ideas about it resonate
with existing identity constructions and institutional legacies. Therefore much of the
chapter is dedicated to the most prevalent ideas about Europeanness in the distant and
especially recent past of Poland.
In the second chapter, methodological details of the study are explained. The study is
based on the articles of the three most important Polish right-wing opinion weeklies,
published in 2016 and 2017. The articles on European dimension of the Constitutional
Tribunal controversy are analyzed by means of frame analysis, aiming to identify the
aspects of perceived reality which are made more salient by the authors in their efforts
to  promote  their  preferred  vision  about  the  essence  and  causes  of  the  rule  of  law
controversy. In the third chapter overview about the empirical data is introduced and in
the fourth chapter portrayal of European identity in it is analyzed. The chapter ends with
general conclusions and discussion where suggestions for further research are made.
After the summary, appendices are added which include tables of the frames and list of
the articles.
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I  EUROPEAN  IDENTITY  AS  A
RESEARCH PROBLEM1.1.  Literature
overview
Literature on European identity
This study draws mostly on the literature of transnational collective identities, while
including important insights also from the research on Euroscepticism. According to
Neil Fligstein, collective identities „refer to the idea that a group of people accept a
fundamental and consequential similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst
themselves,” which is based on common meanings and values created by means of in-
group interaction.  A crucial  part  of its  formation is  the construction of „the Other”.
(Fligstein 2010, 126-127) It is true not only about small groups consisting of people
knowing each other personally, but also about the „imagined communities”of strangers
(term coined by Benedict Anderson). Especially the study of construction of modern
nations  has  earned  much  attention  of  scholars  –  both  social  scientists,  social
psychologists and historians. The study field of transnational identities is however rather
in its infancy.
Even  though  already  1973  foreign  ministers  of  the  EEC  adopted  Declaration  on
European Identity in Copenhagen, identity issues were for a long time largely neglected
both  by  neofunctionalist  and  intergovernmentalist  schools  of  European  integration
scholars. Since 1990s, significant change has occured. (Švarplys 2014, 8-9) On the one
hand, the deepening of the European integration after the adoption of the Maastricht
treaty contributed to the spread of the view that „Europe must become not just useful,
but also meaningful” (Julia Kristeva, cited in Delanty 2005, 127). On the other hand,
contructivist turn in the European identity studies took place. (Švarplys 2014, 9)
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Diverse literature has emerged since then, which mostly concentrates on the questions
of desirability and feasibility of common identity which would bind together people
with different national identities of the EU member-states. View of some scholars that
the  EU  may  remain  a  mere  „problem-solving  entity”  without  sense  of  belonging
together  between  its  citizens  needed,  have  found  less  and  less  supporters  recently.
(Delanty  2005,  132)  Several  authors  have  highlighted  especially  the  importance  of
common identity regarding the cohesion of the EU and its effective operation especially
in times of crisis, demanding sense of solidarity between the citizens of the member
states.  (Karolewski  2017,  3)  If  so,  the  emergence  of  common cultural  (ethnos)  and
political  community (demos) is  arguably needed.  (Delanty 2005, 132-133) Opinions
diverge among the scholars if such communities are indeed in formation and to what
extent.  The discussion about the topic has been difficult  due to the „communicative
islands” separating scholars representing different disciplines and perspectives, while
serious  conceptualization  problems  have  remained  unresolved.  (Kaina  2013,  Kaina
2017;  for  general  overviews  about  the  scholarly  literature  and  state  of  the  art  of
European  identity  studies  see  Checkel  and  Katzenstein  2009,  Jones  2013,  Švarplys
2013, Kaina et al. 2017)
Notably,  many scholars  of European have fruitfully  drawn on interactionist  theories
based on works of Karl Deutsch positing that common identities are based on sense of
community among people which is a result of frequent interaction between them. (Risse
2010,  47-48)  As Neil  Fligstein has  convincingly  demonstrated,  European identity  is
indeed more  prevalent  in  case of  people who use to  travel  abroad,  command other
European languages and therefore have more contacts with people from other European
nationalities. Such people represent often wealthy and educated classes of society while
members of less-privileged classes tend to remain wedded to national identity. (Fligstein
2008, 147-155, 207) According to Fligstein, the future of European integration depends
to large extent on the support of people who hold important both national and European
identities. (Fligstein 2008, 144) It seems that transnational communication plays a part
of  forming  common  understanding  of  Europeanness,  which  has  been  evident  for
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example during the debates over constitutional treaty. Also popular culture and student
exchange programs contribute remarkably to the common ground between Europeans,
especially the young generation (Fligstein 2008, 165-207).
On the other hand, it is now generally accepted that European identity is not going to
replace national ones as national identity has not diminished even in the states which
have  been  members  of  the  EU  for  decades.  It  has  prompted  many  scholars  to
concentrate  on  research  how multiple  identities,  including  especially  European  and
national one, co-exist. Several of the studies have shown that European identity acquires
different  meanings  in  different  national  contexts  (Rumelili  and  Cebeci  2017,  33),
including seminal works of  Juan Díez Medrano (2003) and Thomas Risse (2010).  As
Thomas  Risse  has  shown,  the  relationship  between  them may  be  described  as  the
Europeanization  of  national  identities,  “whereby  references  to  Europe  and  to  the
European Union are incorporated into one’s sense of national belonging” In that sense
meanings  of  Europeanness  are  negotiated  and  constructed  in  the  nation-state  level,
drawing  on  historical,  cultural  and  political  context  of  this  specific  country.  As
“references to Europe and to the European Union are incorporated into one’s sense of
national  belonging“,  “marble  cake”  identities  emerge,  with  national  and  European
identities intertwining or “blending” together. (Risse 2010, 25)
Risse's “marble cake” model is admittedly in line with the empirical evidence. (Risse
2010,  25)  But  there  is  admittedly  rather  few  empirical  studies  which  have  been
dedicated  to  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries.  According  to  Andrius
Švarplys, there have been specific features in construction of collective identities due to
„late  and  peripheral  state  formation  and  nation  building,  very  late  democratization,
economic  and cultural  backwardness.”  Therefore  also ideas  about  Europeanness  are
there  remarkably  different  from  those  of  Western  European,  while  having  some
similarities with countries with the Western European countries with authoritarian past
(e.g.  Spain)  (Švarplys  2014,  11)  Peter  Katzenstein  and  Jeffrey  Checkel  have  also
emphasized that Eastern enlargement led to the “reintroduction” of religion into Europe
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– especially due to the fact that Poland was among the new member states. (Katzenstein
and Checkel  2009,  215)  One of  the aims of  this  study is  to provide new empirical
evidence on these topics.
Literature on changes in European identity
There is on-going debate both in psychology and social sciences over preconditions of
identity change. It is is believed that “strong” identities such as national ones tend to be
sticky, being liable to change only in case of profound crisis, which are often called
“critical junctures” in scholarly literature. Wars, military defeats, but also for example
the events of the year 1989 in Europe have been among such instances. (Risse 2010, 32-
33) The critical junctures provide “a window of opportunity” during which it is possible
to  challenge  commonly  held  views  about  identity  and propose  new ones.  Different
actors pursue their perceived interests during the critical juncture, trying to legitimize
their actions and promote their interpretation of the events. To be persuasive in the eyes
of the public, it is necessary to link new understandings of national or European identity
with preexisting symbols and beliefs. However, opportunity to change is limited. Not all
dramatic  events  are  perceived  by influential  actors  as  a  crisis  and thus  challenging
established  understandings  about  identity.  And  even  in  the  case  of  critical  juncture
emerges,  change  may  not  happen,  if  newly  proposed  ideas  about  identity  do  not
“resonate”  with  existing  “institutional  legacies  and  identity  constructions.”  (Galpin
2014, 21)
In case of changing European identities, the example of Germany after Second World
War is a case in point. Atrocities committed by Nazi regime and military defeat suffered
in  the  war  discredited  earlier  nationalistic  version  of  German identity.  Its  own past
became the “Other” in the new version of German identity while according to the new
consensus being German was inseparably linked to being an (Western) European, which
in turn was seen as based on democracy,  human rights and social  market  economy.
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(Risse 2010, 68)
Another often cited example is the identity change in France. Shift from the idea of
“Europe of nations” towards supporting further integration happened there due to the
changing political circumstances in 1980s. After socialist president François Mitterrand
began to promote the idea of Europe as built on “French values” following the failures
of economic policy, other centrist political forces followed the suit in changing their
perceptions  on  Europe.  The exact  meaning  of  Europeanness  has  however  remained
contested in France. (Risse 2010, 73-74)
Case studies of other European countries have also shown significant transformation of
ideas about Europeanness and European identity. It has been affected by major social
and political processes (modernization, nation building, rise and fall of imperialism) and
political ideologies. In specific countries, attitudes towards Roman Catholic church as
well as towards European or external powers (especially Germany, Russia, Turkey or
the  USA)  have  also  shaped  both  the  strength  of  identification  with  Europe  and
popularity of different concepts what Europeanness means. (Af Malmborg, Stråth 2002)
Since mid-20th century, the European integration process has significantly altered the
national debates over European identity. Questions of membership in the EU, relations
with Brussels  and future directions of  the integration have had profound impact  on
contemporary  debate  about  European  identity  in  the  whole  continent.  Therefore
European  identity  studies  have  been  closely  linked  to  the  research  on  support  of
European integration.
Literature on Euroscepticism
Euroscepticism studies are relatively new field in the political science as mass-scale
opposition to the European integration or membership in the European Union did not
emerge before the adopting of the Maastricht  treaty.  Several  attempts  to  define and
categorize Euroscepticism has been made since then. One of the most popular among
17
them has been the distinction of “hard” and “soft” varieties of Euroscepticism, proposed
by Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart. They define hard Euroscepticism as “principled
opposition to the project of European integration embodied in the EU, in other words,
based on the ceding or transfer of powers to a supranational institution such as EU” In
case of soft  Euroscepticism the opposition is  limited “to the EU`s current or future
planned trajectory based on further extension of competencies that the EU was planning
to  make.”  (Szczerbiak  and  Taggart  2018,  13)  However,  the  meaning  of  the  soft
Euroscepticism has remained fuzzy as in practice it has been difficult  to distinguish
occasional opposition to only some European policies from sceptical attitudes towards
further European integration as a whole. Several attempts to coin new terms for more
them  have  not  however  found  general  approval  nor  usage.  Despite  understandable
explosion in interest to the Euroscepticism in recent years, the study field has remained
fragmented, with no satisfactory synthesis in sight. 
Firstly,  the  studies  have  been  conducted  mostly  by  scholars  of  either  comparative
politics or European integration without sufficient co-operation and cross-fertilization.
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2018a) 
Secondly, opposition to the European integration is diverse both in ideological terms
and across  the specific  countries.  Charles  Bouillaud has distinguished the following
ideological  varieties  of  Euroscepticism:  right-wing  nationalism,  strong  religious
identity, radical left, economic and social neoliberalism. Left-wing Euroscepticism (with
far left, communist and neo-communist varieties) rejects the EU as a capitalist project
while  according to  neoliberal  Euroscepticists,  the EU is  imbued by 'socialist'  spirit.
Right-wing nationalist Euroscepticism comes in turn in two variants. Western-European
one is  linked  mostly  to  anti-immigration  program,  while  Eastern  European  is  more
concerned about  „domination of  Brussels”.  (According to  Pacześniak  2015,  180)  In
Polish case, right-wing nationalism is often linked to rejection of European integration
on grounds of religious identity.
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Finally,  also  rapidly  changing  political  environment  contributes  to  the  complexity.
Notably many of the latest studies about Euroscepticism are dedicated to the impact of
Euro and migration crisis or the Brexit referendum and its consequences. (Hobolt and
De Vries 2016; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2018b) As a result of all of this, fragmentation
in Euroscepticism with recent attempts of summarizing the state of the art of the study
field  highlighting  rather  different  topics  and  authors  (Guerra  2017;  Szczerbiak  and
Taggart 2018a)
For purpose of this thesis, insights from the Euroscepticism studies are relevant in two
sense. Firstly, cultural and identity factors are increasingly seen as one of the causes
behind  Euroscepticism  beside  the  “hard”  utilitarian  and  economic  factors.  (Van
Klingeren et al. 2013, 689) Secondly, not unexpectedly rhetoric used by Eurosceptics is
often adopted by Polish right-wing media in the context of covering the confrontation
between  Poland  and  supranational  institutions  of  the  EU.  Especially  studies  on
Euroscepticism in media provide valuable insights about it. (Caiani and Guerra 2017)
1.2. European identity in Polish discourse
There is vast and diverse literature about European identity in Polish context. (Góra and
Mach 2010). However, there is widely accepted consensus that Polish elites are deeply
divided on European identity issues. These have been by different authors labelled as
differences between essentialist and constructivist identity projects (Wojtaszczyk 2011,
40-41), reflecting cosmopolitan-nationalist cleavage (Galpin 2014, 91), Christian and
Enlightenment roots (Góra and Mach 2010, 231) etc. 
Historical overview
Contemporary ideas and perceptions of Europe draw to remarkable extent on those of
earlier time periods (see anthologies: Loew 2004,  Maciejewski and Machaj 2011). In
the case of contemporary right-wing discourse, two somewhat different approaches may
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be discerned in relation to the identification with Europe. According to one of them,
Poland has a special mission to save Europe – and hence obviously seen itself as a part
of it. Another approach highlights the differences between Poland and Western Europe,
stressing the superiority of Polish values. Both approaches date back more than hundred
years  and  have  since  then  been  repeatedly  adapted  for  using  in  different  historical
contexts, including contemporary debates over Polish place in Europe.
1. Ideas about special mission of Poland in Europe
Throughout the history the peripheral position in Europe has had profound impact on
Polish perception of Europe.  Hence the sense of inferiority, which has been tried to
compensate  by  promoting  ideas  that  Poland has  a  special  role  to  play  in  European
history.  (Skotnicka-Illasiewicz 1997,  35-41)  Often  it  is  related  to  defending it  from
external invaders.  While  due to its  early modern wars with Muscovy and Ottomans
Poland has been seen as antemurale Christianitis, in 1919-21 Poland played allegedly
the crucial role in saving Europe from Bolshevism. (Törnquist-Plewa 2002, 217, 230)
Different vision was sketched by the representatives of Polish Romanticist thought of
the  19th century. For them partitioned Poland had become “Christ of Nations” whose
mission was to lead the liberation of all the subjugated nations in Europe. On the other
hand, ideas about Poland as the custodian and promoter of Christian heritage of Europe,
which  are  currently  popular  among right-wing circles,  have  also  its  origins  in  both
agrarian and Catholic thought of the 19th century. (Törnquist-Plewa 2002, 224)
2. Differences from the West – backwardness or cause for pride?
Often,  however,  it  has  been  noted  that  Poland,  while  no  doubt  belonging  to  the
European family of nations, is in important ways also different from Western Europe.
Since the Enlightenment and the Polish Positivist school, many authors have referred to
Polish  backwardness  and  appealed  for  the  modernization  of  the  country  along  the
Western European lines. (Törnquist-Plewa 2002, 226) These ideas were disputed by the
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authors who claimed that there is no need to feel inferior to the West, despite even the
obvious gap in material prosperity and civilizational development. The proponents of
this so-called Ethnocentrist school claimed that Poland should be proud of its unique
national culture that should be allowed to develop in its own track (Törnquist-Plewa
2002, 221). Europe was thus seen by them as “a model and at the same time a threat for
the  survival  of  the  natural  culture”  and  western  ways  should  have  been  adopted
prudently, not copying those uncritically. (Törnquist-Plewa 2002, 228) Similar divisions
regarding the identification with Europe existed in most other peripheral countries of
both Eastern and Southern Europe. (af Malmborg and Stråth 2002) 
In case of Poland however there were less alternatives to the Western orientation than in
case of some other countries. So unlike in the case of Czechs (Hroch 2002), Russian
orientation  was  not  conceivable  as  an  alternative  to  the  identification  with  Western
Europe and absorption of German cultural influences was also rejected as both were
seen as the main enemies of the nation. (Góra and Mach 2012, 224) Therefore, even
though some thinkers tended to see Poland as a unique bridge between the West and
Slavic  world  (Törnquist-Plewa  2002,  221),  virtually  no-one  disputed  explicitly  the
belonging of Poland to the “Latin civilization” or Europe. (Loew 2004, 21)
Polish  relations  with  Europe  were  however  less  discussed  at  all  since  the  rise  of
nationalist thought, as problems of matching ethnic nationalism with the multi-ethnic
and multi-religious character of Polish society became the most pressing public issue.
However, after the re-establishing of independence in 1918, international position of the
Polish state became the hotly debated issue. As its peripheral position and secondary
importance  in  European  politics  became  evident,  idea  about  Poland  as  a  potential
regional leader of countries between Western Europe and Russia gained popularity. The
projects  of  Intermarum  and  Prometheism3,  promoted among  others  by  the  leading
statesman of the era Józef Piłsudski, are two outstanding examples about it. Perceived
3 The Intermarum (Międzymorze) project aimed tightening co-operation between Eastern European 
states, while Prometheism propagated supporting the independence struggle of non-Russian 
nationalities of Soviet Union – both under the aegis of Poland. See Ištok and Koziak 2009
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distance  with  the  Western  Europe  was  also  emphasized  by  prominent  national
conservative politician Roman Dmowski, who highlighted the alleged flip side of the
Western modernization and predicted decline of “liberal Europe”. According to him the
partition had even been somewhat beneficial for Poland as it had resulted in being “less
European” than would have been the case if it had been an independent state in the 19th
century. (Loew 2004, 21-23)
The Cold War years strengthened pro-European attitudes of Polish intellectuals both in
exile and  (especially since 1970s) at home, since belonging to “Europe” was seen as the
only alternative for the domination of the communist Soviet Union. However, even at
that time sceptical voices appeared, citing for instance civilizational gap, lack of interest
in  Central  Europe on behalf  of  Western  Europeans  or  threat  of  German hegemony.
(Loew 2004, 25-33)
European identity in contemporary Poland (since 1989)
Earlier debates over Polish identity were held in the context where the most important
issues  were  restoring  Polish  independence  or,  since  1918,  strengthening  its
independence  and  position  among  the  European  powers.  European  identity  issues
surfaced mostly  in  the  context  of  modernizing  the  country  and relations  with  other
European states.  Even though European integration projects  and Pan-European ideas
had  been  promoted  also  by  some  Polish  intellectuals,  their  influence  had  been
negligible. (Loew 2004, 27) 
Situation changed profoundly after the gradual dismantling of the communist regime in
1989-90. Since possibility of the membership in the European Union became the issue,
it shaped almost entirely the content of European debates in Poland, including that of
identity.  Besides  ideas  from the past,  these  have been influenced by social  context.
Especially impact of the public opinion, daily politics and perceived Polish national
interests should be noted.
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Accession debate
As  demonstrated  above,  understandings  of  Europeanness  and  European  identity  in
Poland have since 1989 been influenced both by past ideas and political realities of the
day. Prominent liberal authors like Adam Michnik and Bronisław Geremek supported
wholeheartedly  integration  with  European  Union  both  on  the  grounds  of  economic
development and in order to promote democracy as well as liberal values in a country
with authoritarian and nationalistic past. For the leftist thinkers such as Jacek Kuroń,
Europe was also associated with welfare state. Generally the integration with Europe
was perceived both by the liberals and leftists as the opportunity to get rid of reactionary
and backward Polish national heritage. (Góra and Mach 2010, 122) The conservatives
took however exactly the opposite view. 
The national heritage was seen by them in positive terms and the attitudes towards the
European integration depended on to what extent it was perceived as a danger to the
distinctiveness of Poland.
By some, joining the EU was essentially the question about identity. Poland was seen as
a  “core”  or  “authentic”  Europe  and  its  identity  based  on  Catholic  heritage  was
contrasted with western Europe shaped allegedly mostly by Enlightenment tradition.
(Góra and Mach 2010, 231) Many such authors rejected joining the EU as it would be
detrimental not only from the point of view of national interests, but as it also allegedly
put in danger Polish values and way of life. It was especially characteristic for Christian
nationalist  circles  who  were  afraid  that  the  EU would  impose  things  “that  are  not
acceptable in the Polish system of values: abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, denying
the institution of marriage, promoting neutrality of the worldview while at the same
time  suppressing  Christian  values.”  (cited  by  Styczyńska  2018,  72)  Others  were
hesitantly in favor of the accession, seeing Poland once again as a savior of Europe, this
time from moral decay caused by abandonment of its  Christian heritage.  (Góra and
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Mach 2010, 231) 
On  the  other  hand,  it  was  warned  against  uncritically  copying  everything  western.
Besides  highlighting  the  threat  of  secularization,  western  ideas  about  functioning
democracy  and  free  market  economy  were  criticized,  referring  for  instance  to  the
drawbacks caused by the transition reforms. (Góra and Mach 2010, 232) But it was also
critically  noted  that  western  Europeans  had  prejudices  towards  post-communist
countries, seen as backward and in need of being “civilized” according to the western
guidelines. (Góra 2015, 114) Attempts to use post-colonial theories, including rhetoric
about “self-colonization” of Polish pro-European elites have also become fashionable
among  some  rightist  intellectuals  in  analyzing  the  relations  between  the  western
member-states and the EU. (Fomina 2016) 
Other conservative thinkers, while principally agreeing that Poland was different and
morally  superior  from the  western  Europe,  argued  that  identity  questions  were  not
necessarily relevant in the context of European integration. European Union was not
seen by these “Eurorealists” as a community of values, but rather as a playing field of
egoistic  nation-states,  co-operating  because  they  saw  it  mutually  beneficial.  These
pragmatists  or  “Eurorealists”  were thus  less  concerned about  cultural  or  ideological
differences with the West, but discussed rather possible gains and losses of the accession
for Poland. (Hahn 2007, 42-43) What counted the most was if Poland could in the EU to
become an influential member-state or would remain a secondary class member-state,
exploited by the more powerful ones. (Lázár 2015, 224) Also concerns about loss of
sovereignty and principled opposition to the deepening of the integration were voiced.
(Napieralski 2017, 131-137)
To conclude with, there was no unity in the right-wing political scene in the question of
joining the EU. Different actors highlighted either identity or interest-related aspects of
and had different stances on the accession. No clear-cut distinction may be made even
on personal or party lines,  because they were subject to change due to the political
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context, especially calculations about electoral success. But overall League of Polish
Families may be described as a hard Eurosceptic party, emphasizing identitarian and
ideological aspects of the EU, while Law and Justice, including in fact politicians with
various convictions, promoted generally Eurorealist views with stress on Polish national
interests.  (Szczerbiak  2008)  Beside  the  politicians,  the  Catholic  church  played  an
important  role  in  Polish  pre-accession  debate.  While  influential  ultra-conservative
media empire of Rev. Tadeusz Rydzyk put its weight behind the Eurosceptical cause,
majority of the clergy and the church leaders, however, supported cautiously the EU
accession, following the appeal of the Polish pope John Paul II. (Szumigalska 2015,
346-347)
Despite all these differences the right-wing circles had generally in common that they
did not consider the West to be “Us” and support for the membership was qualified at
best. As Law and Justice politician Artur Zawisza put it succinctly: “[The EU] may ask
us to recycle garbage but they can`t force us to [accept] abortion”. (Napieralski 2017,
153)
After the accession
1. In the membership referendum, held in June 2003, 77% of the votes were given on
behalf  of joining the EU. Since then support for membership of the EU have risen,
being also steadily among the highest in the member-states. (Szczerbiak 2012, 14 and
111) According to a recent survey by IBRiS, as much as 84% of Poles wanted Poland to
remain the member of the European Union, while 8% preferred leaving it. (IBRiS 2018)
The high support  for  the membership seems  to be based  mostly on conviction  that
Poland and its citizens have benefited from the membership. (Góra 2015, 127) 
Growing popular support for the European Union led to the decline of hard Eurosceptic
parties; since 2007 they have not been represented in the parliament. (Pacześniak 2015,
184-189) Importantly, popularity of the membership makes also considerably harder to
promote narratives of identity which are inspired by rejectionist ideas.
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2. Party positions on European issues have also been to considerable extent influenced
by daily politics. Not only ideological convictions, but also pragmatical considerations
influence  the  positions  of  parties  on  European  issues,  as  Laure  Neumayer  has
demonstrated on examples of several Central European states (Neumayer 2008). In case
of  Poland,  competition  between  main  parties  for  the  electorate  and also  intra-party
rivalries seem to have contributed to their  public  stances on European issues.  Since
2005  presidential  and  general  elections  namely  two  successor  parties  of  former
Solidarity camp, center-right Civic Platform  (Platforma Obywatelska,  PO) and right-
wing Law and  Justice  (Prawo i  Sprawiedliwość,  PiS)  have  dominated  the  political
scene. Initially seen as natural coalition partners, bitter rivalry between them during the
campaign led to antagonism which defines Polish politics to this  day. (Dudek 2016,
529-544;  Holubec  and  Rae  2010,  199)  In  the  following  elections  PO  has  been
successful mostly in big cities and in the areas of former German partition, as well as
among educated and wealthy classes. PiS has attracted votes especially in Eastern and
South-Eastern Poland, small  towns and rural areas, among less educated and poorer
people. (Dudek 2016, 599-600; 643-645; 687-690)
Following  the  preferences  of  its  supporters,  PO  has  started  to  emphasize  its
unequivocally pro-European credentials. As for the PiS, its voters appear to be more
open for the deepening of the European integration than its leading politicians. (Mach
2012, 199-200) Even so, the supporter base of the party is divided between Eurorealists
and Eurosceptics with clear majority of them supporting Polish membership in the EU.
Overall,  PiS  is  claiming  itself  to  be  an  Eurorealist  party  describing  EU  as  an
“international  organization”  and opposing strongly further  integration.  (Program PiS
2014, 150) However, the need to appease also its Eurosceptic supporters has prompted
PiS emphasize vocally its unwavering determination to defend interests and sovereignty
of Poland against Brussels.4 (Lázár 2015, Pacześniak 2015) These circumstances also
4 Notably Marcin Piechocki has turned attention to the fact that during the presidential campaign 
Andrzej Duda used extensively Eurosceptical rhetoric while at the same time claiming to be a staunch 
supporter of the Polish membership in the EU – something what he calls “allusional Euroscepticism”. 
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constrain  their  options  to  promote  different  understandings  of  Europeanness  and
identities related to them.
3. Influence of Polish-EU relations
Defending Polish national interests in the EU has since the accession been one of the
major goals of Polish foreign policy. Both major political parties have claimed to have a
common goal  –  to  ensure  that  Poland  would  be  an  important  player  in  the  union.
Different strategies have however been applied to achieve it.
During the period 2005-2007, when the government was led by Law and Justice party,
Poland  adopted  tough  rhetoric  about  defending  sovereignty  and  national  interests.
Famously it  slowed down the processing of the European Constitutional  Treaty and
Lisbon treaty, demanding bigger voting rights for Poland. As a result, relations between
Poland and the European Union remained strained and Poland became “an awkward
partner”  for  other  member-states.  (Szczerbiak  2012,  14-20)  The  following  PO
governments (2007-2015) took a different stance, hoping to boost Polish position in the
EU by establishing good relations with its leading states, emphasizing its co-operative
and constructive attitudes and willingness to compromise. On the other hand, it was
tried to strengthen Polish position by taking the initiative in the questions about the
future of the Union. Good examples about it are Radisław Sikorski`s appeal to Germany
for taking the leading role in deepening the integration, but especially the launching of
Eastern  Partnership  program  in  co-operation  with  Sweden.  Also,  in  the  years  of
economic crisis, Poland emphasized its role as a country which could provide leadership
in the time of troubles.  (Galpin 2015, 165-170) The evidence about reactions to the
multiple crisis of the EU confirm the relevance of deep elite division in Poland. While
liberals  payed attention  to  the  European aspects  of  the  Greek crisis,  the  right-wing
media  saw  it  mostly  through  the  lens  of  Polish  sovereignty  and  national  interests.
(Galpin 2015, 172-175)
(Piechocki 2016, 308)
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After  the  PiS  has  re-gained the  power,  the  rhetoric  of  the  government  towards  the
European  Union  has  been  inconsistent,  ranging  from  defiance  to  emphasizing  co-
operativeness and constructiveness. Generally it is however assumed that Poland is once
again moving towards self-isolation in the Union, while the media debates continue
about if Polish interests are better protected by establishing good relations with major
European  powers  or  should  Poland  take  more  self-assuring,  confrontational  stance.
(O`Neal  2017)Finally  it  should  be  noted  that  neither  identity  nor  national  interest
questions have been especially relevant for ordinary citizens. According to a popular
view among the scholars, remarkably high support for the EU member-ship in Poland
reflects  only  satisfaction  over  personal  material  benefits  such  as  free  movement,
agricultural  subsidies,  infrastructure  projects  and evident  improvement  of  the  living
standards. (Mach and Góra 2010, 237)
On the other hand, support of the EU membership has not translated into identification
with Europe: “What is almost completely absent is a reflection about the EU as a such,
and about Europe as a whole. Poles do not identify with Europe, the EU is not `us`,
even if an overwhelming majority value membership very highly and see much more
positive than negative consequences of the accession. `Relations between Poland and
the EU` is an expression commonly heard in the Polish media, as if Poland was not a
member-state“. (Mach & Góra 2010, 237)
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II METHODOLOGY
2.1. Time span
In  order  to  make  make  robust  conclusions  about  possible  rule-of-law  controversy-
related identity change, it is important to apply a longer time span. Therefore the aim of
this study is not to detect the impact of isolated events, but rather the whole process of
confrontation between the EU and Poland. This enables to track changes in time and
take into account combined effect of the developments. The beginning of the year 2016
was  chosen  as  the  starting  point  of  the  study,  even  though  controversy  over  the
Constitutional  Tribunal  began  already  in  December  last  year.  Also  the  first  critical
reactions  of  the  officials  of  the  EU date  back  to  that  time.  However,  formally  the
confrontation with Poland began on January 13 when European Commission launched
rule of law assessment of Poland according to the Article 7 of the Treaty of European
Union. Also, the time span of this study (years 2016 and 2017) covers only first stage of
the rule of law dispute. Making final conclusions about the issue is still not possible as
at the time of completing this study the procedure against Poland had not been officially
completed  yet.  Still,  December  2017  constituted  a  major  watershed  in  the  dispute.
Namely, after two years of futile negotiations, the Commission entered to the second
stage  of  the  procedure,  issuing  its  recommendation  to  Poland  to  change  the
controversial  legislation.  (European  Commission  2017)  The  selected  time-span  also
coincides roughly with the premiership of Beata Szydło in Poland. Next day after she
resigned, Mateusz Morawiecki became prime minister of Poland on December 8, 2018.
The cabinet reshuffle is highly relevant to this study, as the rationale behind that was
according to Aleks Sczerbiak greater emphasis being placed by the governing party “on
economic modernisation, political stabilisation and improving EU relations.” (Szcerbiak
2018)
2.2. Selection of sources
Reasons for selecting media analysis
This thesis is based on media analysis, while some previous studies about European
29
identities in Poland have been conducted by means of elite interviews with domestic
political actors (Napieralski 2017) and focus group research involving representatives of
general public (Góra 2015, Fomina 2017). These studies have revealed how decision-
makers on the one hand and voters on the other perceive essence of being European and
its compatibility with national identity, giving also a glimpse to what extent they are
motivated by ideological convictions and to what extent by pragmatical considerations.
However, in order to detect the attempts to challenge existing identity narratives, it is
necessary  to  analyze  the  discussion  between  the  elites  and  citizens.  Mass  media  is
usually seen as the main “transmission belt” of this public discussion, as it reports both
about words and actions of the politicians, but also about “responses from informed
publics and ordinary citizens.” (Schmidt 2013, 204) Even though mass media is not the
only forum of public discourse on an issue, its role in formation of public opinion is in
contemporary  societies  crucial.  On  the  other  hand,  mass  media  does  not  merely
passively reflect the larger public discourse, but contributes to its creation. Journalists
may “draw their ideas and language from any or all of the other forums, frequently
paraphrasing  or  quoting  their  sources.  At  the  same  time  they  contribute  their  own
frames and invent their own clever catchphrases, drawing on the popular culture which
they share with their audience.” (Gamson 1989, 3)
This study is based on the premise that ideas of Europe and identities based on it are
formed in the course of communicative action. The participants in the media discussions
interpret the ongoing events, drawing not only on their own convictions and identities,
but also perceived interests. As  “legitimacy of claims about ‘‘what is to be done’’ is
open to contestation between elites, and between elites and mass publics, /.../ they must
consider what ideas will be persuasive and establish institutional and political support
for ideas to translate into policy action.“ (Widmaier 2007, 754)
In doing so, they make also statements about belonging. The aim of this study is to
analyze these statements  in  the specific  context  of  rule  of law controversy between
Poland and the EU.
Reasons for selecting print media
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Even though tabloids have often more readers than quality press, they have not been
considered to be so influential in forming public opinion. Therefore similar studies to
this  one  have  in  the  past  often  relied  on  data  of  quality  newspapers  and  public
broadcasting. (D'Haenens 2005; Gatterman 2013; Trenz 2004, 292) Also some previous
studies about European identity in Poland have therefore been based on weekly news
magazines (Żuk 2013, Frankowiak 2016) or daily newspapers (Galpin 2015, 154-190).
However,  emergence  of  Internet  and  especially  social  media  have  brought  about
considerable change in media landscape. For many people, especially among younger
generations, online sources have become primary sources of information. The number
of  readers  of  quality  newspapers  and  news  magazines  has  been  in  decline  and  so
obviously their influence on public opinion formation . Therefore social media has been
analyzed also in several studies which have similar focus to this one. (De Wilde et al.
2013) However, according to recent studies „online discussions are representative of a
small number of people from particular demographics, and women especially are likely
to feel excluded from actively participating in debates“ (Galpin and Trenz 2017, 62).
Importantly,  due  to  fragmentation  of  media  consumption,  but  especially  to  “digital
divide”, it is difficult to generalize the research findings which are based on selected
online sources to the entire population. According to a recent study by state sociological
studies center CBOS, the generational divide is salient also in Poland. For the large
majority of the adult population, either television (64%) or the Internet (21%) is the
primary sources of information about the events in Poland and in the world. But the
Internet was mentioned as the most important source only by Poles aged 18-24 (58%),
while it was entirely marginal for those older than 55 (less than 10%). At the same time
only  4%  of  Poles  claimed  to  rely  primarily  on  print  media.  (CBOS  2017,  2)
Furthermore, available data deals only with the proportions of media consumers, but do
not give us reliable information about which media sources play the most important role
specifically in discursive struggles over Polish and European identity.
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Still, regarding the importance of television in the Polish media landscape first option
would be analyzing analytical or news programs of state television/radio as well  as
private right-wing channels. However, regarding the time span of the study, it would be
an  arduous  task  well  beyond  the  scope  of  a  master  thesis.  Crucially,  many  of  the
relevant podcasts appear also not to be publicly available any more. So, print media
remains the only viable option. Fortunately it seems plausible that conclusions made on
its  basis  may  well  be  generalized  to  the  right-wing media  at  large  as  print  media,
television networks and internet news sites are often interconnected in Poland by means
of ownership and staff. 
Specifically the media corporations which publish weekly opinion magazines, often run
also related web portals. For example, media group Fratria publishes weekly opinion
magazine Sieci and owns web portal wpolityce.pl, which both have Michał and Jacek
Karnowskis as main editors. In the same manner, web portal niezalezna.pl is related to
Gazeta Polska, mediating a significant part  of its content to online readers. Besides,
journalists  of  Gazeta  Polska  and  Do  Rzeczy  launched  2013  a  common  television
channel TV Republika. Its audience has however been rather limited. (CBOS 2017, 3)
However, since PiS came into power in 2015, public radio and television have also been
effectively turned into the mouthpieces of the governing party. Since then, conservative
journalists  who  are  employed  by  or  contribute  to  the  right-wing  opinion  weeklies
feature regularly in their publicistic and news programs.5 Marcin Wolski, who writes
weekly columns for Gazeta Polska and Do Rzeczy, became even the director of public
television channel TVP2.  (Skarżynski 2018)  In that reason, it seems that we can with
due caution suppose that  right-wing print  media,  television and online news portals
frame European identity issues similarly. Presumably some minor differences may occur
due to targeted audience or specifics of electronic media.
5 For the interconnectedness of Polish right-wing media, see Czuchnowski et al. 2017
32
Selection criteria of the print media outlets
Right-wing media
In case of Poland attitudes towards the communist  past,  Catholic church as well  as
related social,  moral and identity issues are the most important determinants of self-
definition as the supporter  of the right.  These are quite  often combined  with  socio-
economic views which are commonly understood as left-orientated.  For that  reason,
some  scholars  have  abandoned  Left-Right  distinction  altogether  in  case  of  Poland.
(Lipiński 2016, 80-83) Still, more often the well-known distinction of Left-Right is still
used  by scholars,  albeit  in  non-traditional  way.  Importantly,  the  notion  “rightist”  is
widely  used  by  public  discourse  in  Poland  to  designate  a  certain  political  option,
sometimes also referred to as „conservative“. For purpose of this thesis, right-wing in
Polish political discourse means broad support for following principles:
1.  Moral  conservatism  (regarding  the  issues  such  as  abortion,  gay  rights,  in  vitro
fertilization, gender roles, church and state relations)
2. Nationalism: 
 supporting memory policies which glorify the nation’s past
 suspicious attitudes towards Germany and Russia
 sceptical attitudes about deepening the European integration or desire to return
to more intergovernmentalist arrangement.
3.  Anti-communist  and  anti-leftist  stances.  Narrative  of  „flawed  transformation”  -
blaming  all  the  problems  of  Poland  to  alleged  continued  dominance  of  former
communists in political and economical life.
(Based on Holubec & Rae 2010; Lipiński 2016).
While in the 1990s Polish right was fragmented,  in recent decades Law and Justice
party has succeeded to become dominant right-wing political force. Therefore in Polish
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discourse also terms right-wing media and pro-government media are not infrequently
used interchangeably. Still, it should be noted that other right-wing political forces also
have occasionally played a certain role in political life of Poland. Notably, the radical
right party League of Polish Families was represented in the Sejm between 2001-07
(and was 2005-07 also represented in the government). The elections of 2015 however
brought to Sejm several right-wing deputies who had run in the list created by rock
musician Paweł Kukiz (Kukiz '15); controversial libertarian politician Janusz-Korwin
Mikke was elected in 2014 into European Parliament. Both have garnered remarkable
support  among  young  people.  (Zbytniewska  2017,  Kołaczyk  2018,  562-563)  Other
extra-parliamentary  radical  groupings  such  as  Ruch  Narodowy  have  drawn  public
attention as organizers of controversial public manifestations.
However, media outlets linked to the extra-PiS right-wing circles (Warszawska Gazeta,
Polska Niepodłega, Najwyższy Czas!) are not included to this study. Not only is their
importance in the formation of public opinion much more limited, but also their content
is  considerably  different  from that  of  main-stream right-wing media,  including  that
some of them use to publish overtly xenophobic and extreme nationalist materials.
Also not included are media outlets of Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk, which are directed towards
ultranationalist and conservative religious wing of PiS supporters (Radio Maryja, TV
Trwam and daily newspaper Nasz Dziennik). However, the importance of these outlets
in formation of public opinion may be overestimated. According to a CBOS survey only
2-4% of the Poles listened to Radio Maryja in 2011 (Szumigalska 2015, 345). In the
tight political race, gaining endorsement of Fr. Rydzyk is still important for the PiS, but
the  heyday  of  his  once  considerable  political  impact  seems  to  be  over,  especially
regarding the impact on the program and rhetoric of the PiS. (Napieralski 2017, 144-
145) Importantly, the views of this grouping, imbued with a specific variety of religious
fundamentalism (Kutyło 2010,  110),  are  also in many ways different  from those of
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mainstream supporters of the PiS and indeed most of Polish Catholics.  (Napieralski
2017, 145) Finally, more mainstream Catholic media outlets such as Niedziela and Gość
Niedzielny are also not included into sample. Even though much of the content of the
magazines is religious, they feature indeed regularly also writings about the politics and
society. But their approach to right-wing thought seems to be remarkably different than
that  of  secular  media,  especially  in  that  they  appear  to  concentrate  mostly  on
conservative morals issues only. As such, they deserve a separate research.
Selection criteria of the media outlets
In  order  to  understand  the  essence  of  the  identity  construction  projects,  it  is  most
suitable to concentrate on media outlets which concentrate rather on longer analytical
pieces,  opinion  articles,  essays  and  interviews.  Therefore  so-called  Polish  opinion
magazines were preferred over daily newspapers. According to Tomasz Mielczarek the
opinion weeklies are largely an uniquely Polish phenomenon. (Mielczarek 2018, 25)
Despite some similarities with weekly news magazines elsewhere in the world, they
dedicate  namely  remarkably  much  more  coverage  to  opinion  pieces  of  publicists,
intellectuals, cultural actors, journalists, politicians and other publicly known figures.
Currently ten titles of the opinion weeklies are published in Poland (Kurdupski 2018).
Of those,  Gazeta Polska,  Do Rzeczy  i  Sieci may be characterized as connected with
governing right-wing Law and Justice party (O`Neal 2017, 31). These weeklies also
have previously tended to promote right-wing views on Polish and European identity
(Lipiński 2016, 38-44;  Frankowiak 2016, 383-385). Therefore these three titles have
been selected for analysis for this study.
Selection criteria for the articles
All  such  articles  were  chosen  for  analysis,  which  had  EU-Polish  dispute  about
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democracy and rule of law as the main topic. It means that if more than half of the
content (most of the sentences) was related to the European dimension of the democracy
and rule of law problems, it was analyzed, but if the article was mostly dedicated to
domestic politics, it was omitted. However, if the European dimension was dealt with in
several paragraphs under separate subtitle, this part of the article was still included to
the analysis. As an exception, all interviews with the members of the government, the
Sejm (lower chamber of the Polish parliament) or European Parliament were included,
even  if  there  was  only  one  single  question  asked  about  international  or  European
dimension of the democracy and rule of law issues. It is inevitable as interviews with
influential politicians usually deal with multiple topical issues.
2.3. Conducting the study
The selected articles were analyzed, using qualitative frame analysis. Framing is the
notion used in media studies since 1970s and refer to meaning creation procedures in
the mass communication.  According to William A. Gamson, “facts have no intrinsic
meaning. They take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that
organizes them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while
ignoring others /.../ A frame is a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant
events and suggesting what is at issue”. (Gamson 1989, 157)
However,  there  is  no  generally  accepted  definition  of  a  frame  which  has  led  to
considerable fragmentation in theory and its practical applications (Scheufele 1999). For
purpose of this study, framing is understood as the action “to select some aspects of a
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a
way  as  to  promote  a  particular  problem  definition,  causal  interpretation,  moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the items described“ (Entman 1993,
52)
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All paper editions of the three magazines from the years 2016 and 2017 were accessed
in the Polish National Library or the library of Warsaw University and browsed page by
page6. Total number of the articles analyzed was 74 (for distribution across the titles and
in time, see appendix 2). Articles which fit to the criteria described above were selected
at this stage and copied for further research. The analysis of the selected articles began
with first reading of them and identifying the frames. Subsequently, closer investigation
of  articles  followed  which  included  the  coding  of  the  frame  packages  in  order  to
facilitate  the  comparison  of  the  articles  and  making  robust  generalizations.  Finally,
articles were re-read one more time to double-check possible errors in coding.
2.4. Limitations to the study
Rule of law dispute is selected for analysis as it has been the most important bone of
contention  between  Poland  and  the  institutions  of  the  EU.  At  the  same  time  other
disagreements between Poland and the EU institutions influenced both the debate over
Constitutional Tribunal and overall perceptions about belonging to Europe. The scope of
this study allows only brief reference to the issues related to the refusal of the Polish
government  to  accept  so-called refugee quotas or curb press freedom. Other  studies
covering these questions should follow to get more accurate picture of possible identity
change in Poland.
This study is based on print media sources, but, as indicated above, its findings may
tentatively be generalized to the right-wing media as the whole. Further studies based on
electronic media and Internet sources could however corroborate the findings. Also, as
noted earlier, this study concentrates on media outlets that are directed towards core
supporters of the ruling Law and Justice Party. The message to this audience may be
considerably  different  from that  of  disseminated to  the  general  public.  Comparative
studies in that field would be needed.
6 Paper editions were chosen, because not all the content of the magazines is available in the Internet. 
Also many online articles are available only for subscribers. It seems however that usually the text 
which is published in the Internet is in case of these magazines identical to that of paper editions.
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Finally,  this  study  is  concerned  with  the  frames  journalists  and  politicians  use  in
interpreting the events to the public and promoting their identity projects. It does not
make  claims  about  the  media  effects  in  shaping  public  opinion.  This  could  be
determined by further quantitative and focus group research.
2.5. Research questions
The  research  aim  was  to  analyze  the  treatment  of  the  European  identity  issues  as
introduced in the previous chapter, according to the following research questions: 
(I)  Is  European identity (as juxtaposed to Polish identity) a salient topic in the
Polish right-wing media and up to what extent?
II) a) How is 'European identity' portrayed in the Polish right-wing media, inside
the context of the rule of law controversy between Poland and the EU?
b) To what extent is the portrayal of European identity different than before the
controversy?
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III POLISH RIGHT-WING MEDIA ON THE RULE OF
LAW CRISIS
3.1. Overview about the analyzed magazines
History of the magazines
During the two first decades of Poland`s newly established democracy leftist, liberal
and centrist media outlets dominated in the media market. Main right-wing weekly at
that time was Gazeta Polska (established 1993), which initially defined itself as liberal
conservative.  It  emphasized  anti-communism,  but  distanced  itself  from  nationalist
Catholicism. (Lipiński 2016, 40) Besides that, media empire of Rev. Tadeusz Rydzyk
was built,  which became influential among religious ultra conservative circles (radio
station  Radio  Maryja,  daily  newspaper  Nasz  Dziennik,  TV station  Trwam)  (Kutyło
2010, 205-206). Profound change on right-wing media scene occurred due to Smolensk
air crash of 2010 in which Polish conservative president Lech Kaczyński and dozens of
members of political  elite were killed.  Since then,  many followers of the right-wing
parties  have  believed  that  the  disaster  was  caused  by  the  plot  of  Russia  with  the
involvement of Polish liberal political elite. These events created considerable spike in
interest for right-wing media. So earlier marginal Gazeta Polska rose among the most
popular weekly opinion magazines (Mielczarek 2016, 150-151). The success of Gazeta
Polska prompted the launch of another right-wing opinion weekly named Uważam Rze
by the media group Presspublika in February 2011. After the change in ownership of the
media group and following conflict  with the new owner,  leading journalists  left  the
Uważam Rze, establishing two new news magazines: wSieci7 with Michał Karnowski
as the main editor (November 2011) and Do Rzeczy edited by Paweł Lisicki (January
2012). (Lipiński 40-41, Mielczarek 2016, 52-56)
7 Since August 2017 published under the title Sieci Prawdy and since January 2018 Sieci. Mielczarek 
2018, 189
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Content
Main  content  of  the  magazines  are  opinion  pieces  and  interviews  about  social  and
political issues, while some articles are dedicated to history, culture and entertainment.
Main emphasis is on domestic politics.8 As for European issues, migration crisis and
terror attacks got much attention. In Gazeta Polska there is a permanent section for short
news  from the  European Union and permanent  column of  MEP Ryszard  Czarnecki
which is usually dedicated to European Union affairs. The same applies to a column of
Krystyna Grzybowska in wSieci (“Around Europe with Krystyna Grzybowka”). Rather
few  of  their  articles  deal  however  directly  with  the  relations  of  Poland  between
European Union. 
Regarding the seriousness of the rule of law confrontation between Poland and the EU it
is amazing how few attention is payed to the issue in the magazines. For example, only
one magazine cover of wSieci the year 2016 was dedicated to that. In case of all the
analysed magazines, it gains coverage usually only in case of major developments (the
speech of Beata Szydło in Strasbourg, meetings of Polish and European top officials,
launching  new  official  proceduresetc.).  However,  in  these  rare  cases  quite  much
coverage may be dedicated to the issue.  In case of rule of law dispute, the magazines
contained the following content:
1. Interviews with government representatives and top politicians. Quite regularly the
magazines  conducted  interviews  with  prime  minister  or  ministers  of  Poland  which
rarely ignored the European Union issues. Also interviews with the Polish and foreign
members of European Parliament were often published.
2.  Reports  and  opinion  pieces  of  journalists  and  publicists.  These  include  both
contributions from the editorial staff and several permanent co-operators. Some of them
are 2-3 pages long thorough analysis while most are short opinion pieces, columns and
8 According to the calculations of Tomasz Mielczarek, about 82% of the content of Sieci and 69% Do 
Rzeczy is dedicated to domestic issues, while overall about half of the both magazines deals with 
political topics. (Mielczarek 2018, 196 and 210)
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feuilletons.  Also  their  content  is  rather  uneven,  ranging  from  mere  repeating  the
government  propaganda  to  (in  rare  cases)  sophisticated  coverage  based  on  inside
knowledge or media reports.
3. Analysis of experts and political commentators. While drawing on worldview and
political positions of the ruling party, they often include insights from historical and
social  sciences  and  provide  in  a  few  occasions  rather  balanced  and  sophisticated
analysis. Texts by professor of sociology Zdzisław Krasnodębski (also MEP of PiS) and
former PO politician Jan Rokita are worth of mentioning in that respect.
4. Lists of readers. Only one or two of them are published weekly and they deal mostly
with feedback to the stories published before.
Beside the rule of law controversy, the future of the European integration and Polish
role in the EU is often discussed. Also the question of re-election of Donald Tusk as
chairman of the European Council was a much covered issue.
3.2. Framing of the conflict with the EU
Virtually never is in the analyzed magazines assumed that irregularities indeed occurred
in  handling  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  crisis  or  even  that  the  opponents  of  the
government themselves sincerely believed in their cause. Generally it is assumed that
„the aim of the debate is not finding the truth, but humiliating of Poland by means of
forcing it to acknowledge true what is a lie.” (prof. Czaputowicz, DR 12.IX.2016, 63) It
is also argued that judicial  reforms in Poland were long overdue due to the lack of
transparency and corruption in the court system. As the judges were allegedly afraid of
losing their  unfair  privileges,  they resorted to urging up anti-government  sentiments
among the  public,  using  the  case  of  Constitutional  Tribunal  as  a  pretext.  Allegedly
political opposition as well as Polish foreign enemies took advantage of it, launching
the campaign against the government both home and abroad. (see DR 12.IX.2016, 63)
In explaining the following confrontation with the European Union, five main frames
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were  used  by  the  magazines,  which  are  subsequently  introduced  in  detail.  For  a
comparative table about the frames used, see appendix 2.
3.2.1. Internal power struggle
One of the most popular explanations to the crisis is that it has to a large extent to do
with the internal power struggle in Poland. This frame was used in 50 articles out of
total  74.  According  to  this  line  of  thinking  the  crisis  was  provoked  by  the  Polish
opposition as it was outrageous due to electoral defeat and desperate in finding the ways
to topple the government. In other words, the ferocious political conflict between the
government and opposition was internationalized. (see for example DR 10.I.2016, 34)
Parties of Platforma Obywatelska and Nowoczesna and the popular movement KOD
which organized  mass  protests  against  the  government,  are  often  mentioned in  that
regard, but also oppositional media is blamed.
Opposition as the initiator of the confrontation with the EU
Sometimes  it  is  suggested  that  domestic  political  actors  are  behind  the  whole
controversy: „If the opposition were not interested in discussion of domestic matters in
European forum, if this signal did not come directly from Poland, this debate would not
have taken place.” (MEP Ryszard Legutko, GP 27.I.2016, 9) It is not always specified,
why opposition politicians are able to persuade European politicians. In many cases,
however, intra-faction solidarity in the European Parliament is cited or importance of
personal  ties  emphasized  („non-formal  influence  network,”  DR  4.IV.2016,  85).
Alternatively it is argued that opposition has considerable influence on media coverage
abroad as western journalists tend to co-operate mostly with liberal Polish journalists
and media  outlets.  Western  politicians  in  turn  base  their  opinion on these  distorted
media reports. (DR 7.VII.2017, 16-17)
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Not seldom attention is also payed to the bias of Polish representatives in the European
institutions, such as president of the European Council Donald Tusk and commissioner
Elżbieta Bieńkowska. They are effectively treated as an extension of Polish internal
opposition: “Most of the Polish representatives in the European institutions are people
representing the former ruling camp. They are defending the status quo, I repeat: they
are people who have not come to terms with losing the power.” (president Andrzej Duda
in an interview, wS 25.I.2016, 10) According to other opinions the bias of the Poles of
Brussels is evident at least in the fact that they remain passive in the debate, not using
the opportunities to defend Poland against the unfair  allegations.  Interestingly all  of
these allegations are made in articles which have been published in the beginning of the
controversy  (January  and  February  2016).  A big  role  is  allegedly  played  also  by
European Parliament members who represent liberal oppositional parties (PO, PSL and
SLD). It is believed that besides “snitching” (for example DR 4.IV.2016) they have also
covertly contributed to the wording of the resolutions against Poland  (GP 20.IV.2016,
21) 
Such interpretation treats Polish opposition as the main „Other” while attitude towards
European  political  actors  is  neutral.  They  may be  depicted  as  ignorant  and naively
believing the version of the opposition about the crisis of Constitutional Tribunal. So,
explaining the real circumstances would make sense and perhaps be crucial for solving
the crisis.  Indeed, representatives of the government argued repeatedly that this  had
proved effective: „European leaders have understood that they did a mistake, trusting
the version of the opposition in assessment of current events in Poland”, argued  prime
minister Szydło in one occasion (wS 13.II.2017, 28). Even some right-wing journalists
however disagree, blaiming also miserable political abilities and communication skills
of the government camp which had helped the opposition to dominate in the foreign
media  and disseminate  therefore  successfully  their  distorted  accounts  of  the  events.
(Dominika Ćosić, DR 14.III.2016, 32-34)
However, European politicians are usually not referred to as “Us” either. It is presumed
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that European politicians may reject the opposition's version about the Constitutional
Tribunal controversy simply because they would be sincere in their attempts to find out
the truth. It is not assumed that there is a common identity or common values which
would drive them to support Polish government.
Co-operation with the external “Other”
More often it  is argued that both opposition and European actors use Constitutional
Tribunal controversy as a pretext to pressurize Poland. While occasionally described as
“parallel  attack  from  outside  and  inside”  (wS  13.II.2017,  29),  it  is  more  often
understood as coordinated between the leaders of opposition and European politicians.
Prime minister Szydło offered the following explanation:  “Politicians from PO with
Grzegorz Schetyna ahead, who made visits to Brussels and spoke about it that in Poland
democratic foundations of rule of law are violated, have their share in the decision of
the commission [on launching the procedure against Poland]. But in a certain moment
the situation got out of their control” and the EU institutions began to use the allegations
for furthering their own ends. (DR 18.I.2016, 14) In some cases the external enemies are
influential  member-states  of  the  EU,  in  other  cases  European  institutions  or  their
leaders, and in yet other instances “European establishments” (their alleged motives are
described below in respective subsections). 
According to this frame, both opposition and Europe (or “the West”) are the “Others”.
However, they are not equal in power – in virtually all articles opposition is considered
to be a weaker partner who is desperately needing help from their European allies and is
therefore dependent on them. For the conservative government it means the opportunity
to  make  deals  with  Europeans  over  the  head  of  the  opposition.  Indeed,  some
commentators suppose that determination of Europeans to fight against the government
of PiS is weaker than that of the Polish opposition. So especially in the summer 2016
when it became evident that the procedure against Poland was progressing slowly, right-
wing commentators in Poland rushed to suppose that it was a sign about the intention of
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European institutions to back down or compromise (wS 6.V.2016, 28-30). Often it is at
least supposed that European Commission is split between hawks and doves in the issue
of Poland which may lead to  the favorable solutions  for Poland if  the latter  would
prevail.
However, willingness of Europeans to compromise is supposed to be linked exclusively
to the need for concentrate to more urgent issues for the Union – or perhaps due to the
cracks with their Polish partners. So, European politicians are treated as the Other who
is easier to make deals with, not inevitably closer or less harmful than the opposition.
On  other  instances,  European  actors  (meaning  either  nation-states,  institutions  of
Brussels or “the Establishment”) are however also seen as more dangerous enemy than
the opposition. As they are allegedly determined to subjugate Poland, the opposition is
seen  as  co-operating  with  an  external  enemy:  „Voices  of  the  politicians  from  PO
disseminate well-known message to European political  elite:  „We will  together with
you, in accordance with your interests, attack Poland, therefore it pays off for you to
return us to the power”.” (Joanna Lichocka, GP 6.IX.2017, 40) Willingness to become
vassals  of  the  Westerners  means  that  their  activities  are  “close  to  treason”  (DR
6.VIII.2017, 3).
This  line  of  thinking  resonates  strongly  with  history  narrative  about  unique  Polish
“tradition of treason” in Polish history which has been popular in right-wing discourse.
Especially  often  are  the  attempts  of  Polish  opposition  to  appeal  to  the  European
institutions referred as Targowica – a synonym for the treason in Poland,9 used earlier
for example also for those who  made compromises with the communists  during the
Round Table talks  in 1989  or later  for those who supported  joining the EU.  (Haska
2018,  307-311)  So,  according  to  MEP Ryszard  Czarnecki  (PiS)  pursuits  to  achieve
domestic political goals by calling help from abroad have been common throughout the
9 Hint to the confederation of Polish noblemen who co-operated with Russia in an attempt to abolish the
Constitution of May 3, making inadvertently possible the Second Partition of the I Rzeczpospolita. See
Davies 1984, 535; Haska 2018, 10-17
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Polish  history.  According  to  him,  it  is  unique  in  Europe  as  in  other  countries
oppositional parties arguably avoid confronting government in issues of foreign policy.
(MEP Ryszard Czarnecki, DR 7.VIII.2016, 20) 
Needless to say that such an interpretation of the events leaves no room for constructing
common national identity with the supporters of the opposition – and also common
unity of European nations.
3.2.2. Struggle for power between EU member states
Another  popular  frame  was  related  to  the  argument  that  behind  the  Constitutional
Tribunal controversy was the desire of either „Western Europe“ in general, European
institutions or influential member-states to keep Poland weak in the international arena.
This frame was used in 51 articles.
International position of Poland
International position of Poland has been important issue for all major political parties
in Poland. Civic Platform governments claimed that their  co-operative approach had
helped Poland to boost its standing, referring for example to the election of its prime
minister Donald Tusk to the position of the president of European Council. Right-wing
political commentators claim however that it was an illusion as in fact Polish interests
were still ignored in the EU decision-making. (GP 18.I.2016, 8)
Language  usage  in  that  context  often  reveals  that  right-wing  Poles  feel  deeply
humiliated  due  to  the  international  position  of  their  country.  Notably,  the  western
politicians are repeatedly labelled as “teachers”10 who treat Poland as though it were a
naughty  schoolboy  who  should  unquestionably  accept  their  authority  or  face
10 In Polish, colloquial dismissive word 'belfer' is used instead of formally and more commonly used 
'nauczycieł'
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punishment. (DR 6.VI.2016)
The representatives of PiS government have repeatedly expressed their determination to
change it: „For us only one thing is important, already from the days of presidency of
Lech  Kaczyński:  subjectivity  [podmiotowość].  Poland  has  maximum  and  minimum
ambitions. Maximum means participation in decision-making in the European Union,
minimum - participation in decision-making in the sphere of Eastern politics. Minimum
plan has already been realized, now it is time for maximum plan“. (foreign minister
Witold Waszczykowski, wS 3.VII.2017)
According to both right-wing politicians and journalists exactly such an assertive stance
has provoked the attack against Poland: „Let us not be surprised that suddenly so much
interest has arisen in the democracy and rule of law in Poland. After all, this is not all
about that.  These are the sticks, what are needed to divide Poland and emphatically
show us our place in the pecking order [swoje miejsce w szeregu] – or rather in the
corner as has been the case so far.” (MEP Ryszard Czarnecki, GP 20.I.2016, 43)
As especially government politicians tend to emphasize, Poland had indeed began to
gain strength which made its adversaries even more ferocious: “Without doubt Poland is
situated in the first league of key states regarding the future of the EU. We are perceived
as  a  dynamical,  ambitious  country  with a  good plan  for  ourselves.  This  rise  of  the
importance of our state of course is not liked by all and this is one of the reasons of the
attacks against Poland”. (prime minister Beata Szydło, wS 13.II.2017)
As issues of power, prestige and dignity are at stake, there is no wonder that debates on
rule  of  law  in  Poland  turned  rather  emotional:  “Background  of  the  attacks  against
Poland are the endangered interests, but not only. A big role is played also by mental
shock which has been experienced by our former “guardians”. (journalist Piotr Semka,
wS 25.I.2016, 3)
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Sovereignty and independence
According  to  some  articles  not  only  international  position  of  Poland,  but  also  its
sovereignty or even independence was at stake. Commonly it is argued that according to
treaties the European Union institutions had no right to meddle in the Polish dispute
over the Constitutional Tribunal.  So it is interpreted as one of the attempts to bring
decision-making in internal affairs of the member states to Brussels. (e.g. MP Terlecki,
wS 6.V.2016, 42). However, many commentators go even further, painting a very grim
picture  about  the  inability  of  Poland  to  make  independent  decisions.  Notably,  the
European Union is compared with Soviet Union: „Brussels behaves with Warsaw in the
manner – one may have such impression – like once Moscow did with its satellites.
Threatens with sanctions, teaches, reprimands, shows us our place in the pecking order”
(journalist Lisicki, DR 23.V.2016, 3; cf. opinion of German MEP Hans-Olaf Henkel GP
13.I.2016, 16).
In some articles the crucial role that judiciary plays in the defense of state sovereignty is
highlighted, which arguably may explain why specifically the issue of Constitutional
Tribunal  evoked  so  fierce  resistance  from  Europe.  „With  the  help  of  courts  and
Constitutional Tribunal it was possible to block the changes, which would cause Poland
to  become  a  sovereign,  strong  country,”  argues  Tomasz  Sakiewicz.  If  Polish
Constitutional  Tribunal  would  follow  the  example  of  its  German  counter-part  and
stipulate that the law of Poland takes primacy over European Union one, “The Sejm
would do what it wants, and certainly not what the Union wants. German and European
bureaucrats cannot afford it for themselves.” (GP 6.IX.2017, 3) However, rather often it
is not specified at all, what is exactly meant by sovereignty or danger for independence.
(e.g. WS 25.I.2016, 81)
Economic interests
The confrontation between Poland and the influential  member-states (or respectively
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between western and eastern states) is according to the texts not only about power and
prestige, but often also about economic interests.
Firstly, economic growth in the East is faster which means that welfare of the people in
the West is in danger: „Behind the ideology of criticizing Poland is money. President
Macron, fighting with Poland, fights for the interests of the French. What should the
leaders say to the nations who are losing out in the global competition? Go to work?
Give up going every day for two-hour-long lunches, take sandwiches with you to the
workplace as Poles do?“ (Foreign minister Waszczykowski, wS 3.VII.2017)
Secondly,  western  states  have  so  far  enjoyed  opportunities  to  exploit  the  poorer
member-states in their own interests. In that context the relationship between western
countries and Poland is often described as (post)colonial: „In the interests of Germany is
not to keep at the shores of Vistula a modern society which knows its rights. They prefer
to  have  here  a  post-colonial  country,  with  industry  which  is  dying  out,  low living
standards and with politicians who are raising their hand each time when it is favorable
to German interests. In Brussels and in Warsaw. In editorial boards and marches for the
democracy.“ (wS 18.I.2016, 44) In the similar vein, the perceived anti-Polishness of
Frans  Timmermans is  explained by his  attempts  to  protect  business  interests  of  the
Dutch. Also, at the beginning of the crisis several commentators argued that allegations
against Poland were connected with government plans for introducing special taxes for
banks  and  supermarkets.  Foreign  entrepreneurs  who  were  afraid  of  losing  their
“privileges” and huge unfair profits reportedly got the support of their governments who
used rule  of law issue as a  tool  to  pressurize Poland to give up these plans.  (MEP
Ryszard Czarnecki, GP 20.I.2016, 43)
West-East split
While sometimes the dispute is perceived as going on between Poland and the European
Union, sometimes it is also described as being between Western and Eastern member-
49
states as a whole. According to this point of view, “old” European states try to retain
their privileged position in the union against the emerging post-communist ones: “Big
players in the Union who come from Western Europe fear that Eastern Europe would
become more active, and Poland plays in this process an important role, also Visegrád
Group and Three Seas Initiative. This may change the architecture of power in Europe.
The western side, however, does not want it, being accustomed to have all the cards.”
(MEP Ryszard Legutko, DR 31.VII.2017, 33) That is why westerners seek confrontation
also with other countries of the region, notably Hungary. But as Poland is the most
influential among them, it is attacked most ferociously, which explains the launching of
the Article 7 procedure against it. (GP 20.I.16, 2)
Competition between the nation-states
Even though authors tend to agree that the issue of Constitutional Tribunal led Poland to
the conflict with “the West”, there are different opinions who is actually in charge there.
Still,  most  of  the  commentators  seem  to  assume  that  European  Union  is  an
intergovernmental  organization which is  steered  by a  few influential  member-states.
With the words of MEP Ryszard Legutko: „Commission is dependant on main political
players, first of all from Germany and France. That Timmermans romps [in attacking
Poland], means, that he is allowed to do so“. (DR 31.VII.2017, 33)
In several instances,  it  is  even stated that  European Union is  in fact under German
control (journalist Wolski, DR 25.I.2016, 64) and is used as a tool to achieve its narrow
national interests. Such claims are nothing extraordinary, being previously used also by
prominent PiS politicians.  (Krzyżanowski 2015, 12-13) Therefore also the rule of law
dispute with the European Union may essentially be reduced to the issue of German-
Polish relations. It may be interpreted as an attack on behalf of „German colonizers”
who defend their economic interests (GP 13.I.2016, 12) or part of establishing German
dominion over the countries of Central  Europe as it  is an inevitable precondition of
becoming a regional superpower. (GP 6.IX.2017, 3) Even appeals for federalization of
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the  EU  may  be  perceived  as  covert  attempts  to  establish  German  hegemony  over
Europe. (GP 13.I.2016, 12) However, more often France and Germany are mentioned as
the two states which determine the direction of the European Union politics (e.g. foreign
minister Waszczykowski, wS 11.II.2016, 30). Once also Great Britain is referred to (GP
27.I.2016, 15). Other states are never mentioned in that context.
This chimes in with the understanding of the European Union in the program of PiS
(PiS 2014): “Membership in the international organizations, such as European Union or
North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be treated as a tool of realization of Polish
national interests and creating  favorable environment for us for co-operation with other
countries, and not goal in itself or limitation of subjectivity of Poland”. (PiS 2014, 150)
The  Gaullist  ideal  of  “Europe  of  nation-states”  is  also  repeatedly  invoked  by
government representatives in the analyzed articles.
As according to this discourse European Union is seen exclusively as a playing ground
of nation-states who follow their selfish interests, there is non-surprisingly no talk about
common  identity  between  them.  However,  it  is  sometimes  spoken  about  solidarity
between post-communist member-states or Visegrád countries (DR 25.I.2016). Mostly it
is spoken about their common interests, but sometimes also about friendship which is
based  on  historical  ties.  However,  not  all  commentators  see  European  Union  in
intergovernmentalist terms, as indicate the opinions quoted above that both “Berlin and
Brussels” are to be blamed for the attacks against Poland.
3.2.3. Attack from the side of „the European Establishment”
“The  European  Establishment”,  “European  bureaucrats”  (“Eurocrats”),  „European
salons” or elites are also mentioned among them who are behind the attack on Poland.
However, this frame is used in 16 articles only. The theme is also not elaborated, being
usually only mentioned with one or two sentences in articles which concentrate mostly
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on other frames. According to Marcin Wolski “the Establishment” consists of „alienated
Eurocrats,  financial  oligarchs,  media  magnates  and  journalistic  liars”  (Wolski,
6.VIII.2017, 54). Usually however is the term defined vaguely or not at all. But it seems
to  designate  powerful  and  influential  people  who  thanks  to  their  connections  have
secured  unfair  privileges  and  seek  rather  their  self-interest  than  national  interest  or
common good. Officials of the European Union institutions (“Eurocrats”) are often put
into this category. 
The  Establishment  is  believed  to  be  conspiring  against  Poland  because  policies
conducted by its new government put their privileges, wealth and power under threat.
Firstly,  planned economic reforms in Poland were not  only contrary to  the national
interest  of their  home countries, but also against their  private business interests. For
example in one of the articles it is claimed that „behind the debate about rule of law in
Poland are people who are linked to Economic Council of CDU”. Several names of
prominent businessmen who belong to the council are mentioned who have business
interests  both  in  Greece  and  Poland.  It  is  attempted  to  show  that  they  have  been
successful in influencing the policy of the EU towards both countries. Notably, business
interests of the elite are seen as identical with economic interests of the nation: “For the
people who control today the key sectors of the economy in many countries of the
Union, including Poland and Greece, every national government which does not realize
the interests of Germany is a threat. (GP 13.I.2016, 12-13)
But  main  concern  of  the  “Establishment”  is  allegedly  the  fact  that  in  a  rather  big
member-state a government has taken power that represents not the elite, but “ordinary
citizens”. According to prime minister Beata Szydło Poland has therefore become their
beacon of hope in entire Europe: “I understood that different interest groups, who are
losing their unfair privileges would defend them with the help of all possible means,”
which explains why the attack against Poland was so ferocious. “But the coin has also
another side. For many people not only in Poland, but also in Europe we bring hope of
normal politics, whose center is not in the political correctness which  endangers even
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free discussion, but citizen and its problems.” (wS 1.II.2016, 27) Besides the spillover
of the anti-Establishment revolt („Polish virus of freedom”, as one commentator puts it)
to the other European states (DR 15.II.2016, 16), there is also the danger that Poland
would start to change politics in the European Union level: “Unfortunately these Poles
do not want to leave the European Union, they demand reforms of the EU, so that it
would serve common citizens, not selected „people of success”, or the Establishment
and other groups privileged by Brussels.” (wS 1.VIII.2016, 77)
3.2.4. Power struggle within the European Union
As mentioned above, many right-wing commentators see European Union largely in
intergovernmental terms. Still, expressions as “Berlin and Brussels” reveal that not all
commentators think that influential nation-states are the sole decision-makers in the EU.
It is often not specified, what is meant for the “Brussels”, but one may suppose that by
that bureaucrats of European institutions are meant who have either their own or their
institutional  interests  in  mind.  Their  hostility  towards  Poland  may  be  explained  by
means of ideological bias (it will be discussed later). But sometimes the top officials of
the EU institutions are not even perceived as necessarily vehemently anti-Polish. They
are allegedly simply trying to use the debate and the article 7 procedure as a means to
enhance their own prestige and power. Following motives are distinguished:
1. Distraction
Attacking  Poland  is  a  convenient  opportunity  to  distract  attention  from  the  “real
challenges”  which  have  been  or  are  faced  by  the  European  Union  –  e.g.  Brexit,
immigration or Euro crisis. As European Union has failed to tackle these problems, it
seeks to direct public attention to the issues of secondary importance. On the other hand,
forcing  Poland  into  submission  would  also  help  to  boost  waning  prestige  of  the
supranational institutions of the EU. (MEP Poręba,  GP 20.IV.2016, 21) Rule of law
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dispute in Poland proved to be an ideal case in this respect. (PM Szydło, GP 1.VI.2016,
6)11
2. The attempt of the European Commission to enhance its power
This point of view is presented especially by politicians of PiS: “In the European Union
the attitude towards the treaties is  quite frivolous.  Taking advantage of it,  European
Commission tries to enhance scope of his authority designated in the treaties. Issues of
Poland and Hungary are good examples about it. Commission, using the method of faits
accomplis and  having  the  approval  of  the  majority,  has  made  of  itself  a  superior
authority regarding the nation states (of course those of less important,  as they lack
courage to confront the important ones)”. (MEP Ryszard Legutko, DR 31.VII.2017, 33)
Roughly  similar  opinion  is  voiced  by  Hungarian  MEP  György  Schöpflin  who  also
reminds that at the beginning of its presidency Juncker stated that his commission will
be more „political” than previous ones. (DR 24.X.2016)
3. Personal power struggle within the European institutions
It  seems  that  this  explanation  is  used  mostly  by  European  Parliament  members  or
prominent  politicians  though  in  some  cases  also  by  journalists  who  seem  to  have
exceptionally good knowledge of European Union politics. Even though sometimes it is
referred vaguely to inside information, mostly these articles seem to be built on wild
speculations.  Many times it  is  argued that  the European Commission is  split  in  the
question on how to handle the Polish question. Often though not always the president of
the Commission Jean-Claude Juncker is seen as willing to compromise. On the other
hand, Frans Timmermans, deputy president and at the same time the EU negotiator in
the  rule  of  law dispute,  is  perceived to  be  a  hardliner:  “We know also  that  in  the
11 Even though this argument is mostly used in the context of European-level politics, two times it is also
claimed that Emmanuel Macron and or Angela Merkel are criticizing Poland in order to distract 
attention from their domestic problems, namely by MEP Saryusz-Volski (wS 22.X.2017, 34) and by 
prime minister Szydło (wS 10.IX.2017, 20).
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background of this bashing of Poland is the struggle for influence in the Union itself.
Clear distance from such behavior towards our country is held by the leader of The
European Commission  Jean-Claude Juncker.  During  discussion  in  that  question,  the
Commission was, according to information we have got, divided in half. And finally the
first  deputy  leader  of  the  Commission  Frans  Timmermans  made the  decision  about
launching the procedure [of article 7 against Poland]”. (PM Beata Szydło, wS 1.II.2016,
28) Usually such assessment of the situation is linked to the hope that the accusations
against Poland would be lifted if the faction which is benign towards Poland would
prevail. (cf. wS 25.VII.2016, 36)
In one article it is claimed that essentially are both of the alleged factions unfavorably
disposed toward Poland and their differences are only tactical. (wS 30.V.2016, 29-30)
More  often  it  is  assumed,  however,  that  disagreements  between  Juncker  and
Timmermans  are  linked  to  their  personal  rivalry.  The  perceived  malevolence  and
ferocity of Timmermans toward Poland is explained by means of his desire to improve
his personal positions  in this  game for power.  According to  MEP Ryszard Legutko:
“Timmermans raises unceasingly the question of Poland and Hungary, because only by
this manner he is able to exist politically. His party has ceased to matter and he himself
exists only as far as he can publicly present something which attracts attention. That is
why this ceaseless nitpicking in case of Poland. If there were no government of PiS,
nobody would know who is that Timmermans”. (DR 21.VII.2017, 33)12
4. Power struggle within the European Parliament
Support of the major  political  groups of European Parliament  to  the attacks against
Poland are often explained by means of solidarity with their Polish member parties or
ideological considerations. For example it is emphasized that main opposition parties of
Poland (PO and PSL) belong to the biggest political group (European People's Party)
12 Hungarian MEP György Schöpflin at the same time considers Timmermans to be the most influential 
person in the Commission and tends to explain his alleged anti-Polish stances by means of his 
ideological convictions. (DR 24.X.2016, 80)
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which also helped to shape overall critical atmosphere in the European Parliament in
Polish question. (German MEP Henkel,  GP 13.I.2016, 11) However, sometimes it is
also  supposed  that  behind  the  extraordinary  activity  of  Guy Verhofstadt  in  bashing
Poland is his hope that the constitutional crisis would boost the popularity of the liberal
party Nowoczesna which took actively part in the oppositional protests. Verhofstadt is
allegedly hoping that with his assistance Nowoczesna would win some seats for ALDE
in  European  Parliament  which  has  so  far  performed  very  poorly  in  Poland.  (MEP
Krasnodębski, DR 3.X.2016, 28)
3.2.5. Ideological conflict
In 30 articles ideological dimension of the confrontation is mentioned. However, in 15
articles it is only referred in passing that those “attacking” Poland are biased towards
Poland because of its national conservative government. (e.g. DR 12.IX.2016, 63) In
one occasion the hearing on Poland in European Parliament is also simply referred as “a
liberal kumbaya” (DR 18.IV.2016, 21) Merely in 14 articles which use the ideological
frame,  the  topic  is  dealt  with  in  more  than  3  sentences.  Of  those,  two  somewhat
different  lines  of  thought  may be  distinguished.  Some commentators  blame namely
merely western leftist and liberal politicians for the confrontation, while according to
the others there is deeper watershed between the Polish and Western societies.
Liberal-conservative split
The proponents of this interpretation draw attention to the fact that the most furious
attackers of Poland represent leftist and liberal parties, political groups or media outlets:
“Main forces who attack Poland are not some non-partisan circles, some higher officials
who are selected by means of  competition by the headhunters.  They are leftist  and
liberal politicians.” (MEP Czarnecki, DR 7.VIII.2017, 21) In that case, liberalism and
leftism  (socialism)  are  perceived  as  similar  ideologies  and  often  treated  as  nearly
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synonymous  terms.13 Zeal  of  leftists  and  liberals  to  intervene  to  the  Constitutional
Tribunal crisis is explained in turn in two different ways.
First,  specific features of their  ideologies are referred to.  For example,  according to
Hungarian  member  of  European  Parliament  György  Schöpflin leftist  politicians  are
concerned  about  human  rights  issues  and  wish  to  make  them  central  also  in  the
European politics. (DR 24.X.2016, 79) However, more often it is emphasized that leftist
and liberal politicians tend to support federalization of Europe and want to diminish the
importance of nation-states: “Commission is the representative of leftist majority in the
European Parliament. As the representative of this majority the Commission consists of
leading politicians of the European Left, whose objective seems to be fight off national
governments.” (DR 22.II.2016, 80)
Second, the attacks from the left and liberal politicians against Poland are explained by
their intolerance toward conservative views. With the words of then-foreign minister
Witold Waszczykowski: “Now Europe is experiencing a shock as it has become evident
that parties which are promoting family values or which are related to religion have not
only survived, but have in some countries managed to get into power. Therefore some
leftist politicians lose their nerve.” (DR 3.VII.2017, 28) Similar is the explanation by
MEP Ryszard Czarnecki: “The leader of European liberals Guy Verhofstadt feels very
uncomfortable because Polish liberals are so significantly weak. And thus there is clear
ideological background to these attacks”. (DR 7.VIII.2017, 21)
Often it is gone even further, claiming that current political positions of some prominent
European politicians are explainable by means of the fact that they flirted with different
radical left ideas in their youth. Introducing an extensive article which is dedicated to
exposing  their  past,  editor-in-chief  of  Do  Rzeczy  Paweł  Lisicki  emphasizes  in  his
editorial that many of such politicians were in European Parliament especially ferocious
in criticizing Poland during the hearing about the Constitutional Tribunal crisis: „All
13 The same is true to the terms conservative and right-wing and national-conservative which are used to 
designate the ideology of the Polish governing party.
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those  see  in  communism positive  features,  accepting  that  this  criminal,  totalitarian
ideology was essentially a source of emancipation and freedom“. (DR 10.XII.2017, 49)
The supporters of this line of thinking tend to downplay the fact that also many center-
right politicians (especially from the political group of European People's Party) have
condemned the actions of the Polish government during the rule of law crisis. To the
contrary,  at  least  some  center-right  politicians  are  depicted  in  the  articles  as  less
enthusiastic  in  fighting  against  Poland  and  more  ready  for  compromises.14 (DR
25.VII.2016, 36)
On  the  other  hand  it  is  remarkable  that  ideological  considerations  are  dealt  with
exclusively in case of explaining the motivation of foreign political actors. In case of
Polish opposition, its thirst for power and disloyalty to their homeland is denounced, but
as a rule no ideological motivation is seen behind their activities.
Western-Eastern split
According to  some commentators  not only leftist  and liberal forces of the West  are
behind the attacks against Poland, but due to profound change since the 1960s the whole
societies  there  have  been imbued with  wicked leftist  spirit.  It  has  transformed also
political right, which has become “pragmatical, devoid of ideas and tired” (Lisicki, DR
10.XII.2017, 4) and does not differ from socialists any more (Wolski, DR 7.VIII.2017,
54). As Poland has allegedly remained true to the authentic European values, it leads
inevitably to conflicts with the West. Rule of law controversy is simply one of these.
(Lisicki 2017) Similar ideas are rather often presented in the analyzed magazines. For
example, it  seems to be one of the favorite topics of Tomasz Terlikowski, author of
religious  columns  for  Gazeta  Polska.  Surprisingly  however,  in  the  context  of
Constitutional Tribunal controversy this topic is elaborated only in a couple of articles
and  never  in  Gazeta  Polska.  Repeatedly  is  this  frame  used  by  small  number  of
journalists, especially by the editor-in-chief of Do Rzeczy Paweł Lisicki, columnist of
14 This is significantly at odds with the claims that European People's Party is pushing the campaign 
against Poland  as the main opposition parties of Poland are its members. (compare section 4)
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Do Rzeczy Marcin Wolski and columnist of w Sieci Krystyna Grzybowska.
In these articles are also identity topics often explicitly dealt with and the West (which is
depicted  as  being  in  charge  in  the  EU)  is  seen  as  „the  Other”.  Lisicki  provides  a
comprehensive list about ideas which have to his mind shaped it: “First, hate against
tradition of Christian Europe. Second, enmity toward nation state as the most important
subject of history. Third, fascination with different contemporary „isms“ which have
substituted  former,  fatigued  and  tired  Marxism and  its  class  struggle.  So  there  are
radical  feminists,  genderists,  ecologists,  supporters  of  abortion  and  sex  change,
promoters of homosexual and lesbian relationships.” (DR 10.XII.2017, 4) In another
article he mentions also multiculturalism and anti-racism as harmful ideas characteristic
to the West (DR 10.IX.2017, 3).
In contrast Poland is according to Marcin Wolski a good example of successful and
modern conservative society proving that also nowadays „there may be a country with
open churches  and safe streets  without  islamic  maggots  [pozbawionych islamskiego
czerwia ulic]. World that is proud of the past and confident with the future. World of
values based on common sense, where mind have not been captured15 by the political
correctness,  this  genuinely  Orwellian  censorship  of  the  modern  times.”  (DR
7.VIII.2017,  54)  Similar  ideas  are  presented  elsewhere  with  a  slight  variation.  (wS
25.I.2016, 93; wS 10.VII.2017, 94, wS 22.II.2016, 81) Christianity or Catholicism is
remarkably often mentioned as the component of Polishness, as well as national pride or
glorious history.
Occasionally it is claimed that values attributed to Poles are common also for the other
Eastern European countries:  „Violent reaction of the of Verhofstadt to the speech of
prime minister Beata Szydło indicated that ideology imposed to the community is in
retreat  while  more  and  more  matter  among  the  citizens  of  the  EU  member  states
sovereignty and sentiment of national dignity; moreover that in the states of former
15  „Umysłów nie zniewala...” Probably reference to the collection of antitotalitarian essays by Czesław 
Miłosz („Zniewolona umysł” (1953), title in English „Captured minds”)
59
communist camp left-liberalism is not enthusiastically adopted except by the ideological
margins  while  do  matter  the  Christian  values,  and  in  that  way  genuine  canons  of
Europe, in which these nations had their roots” (Grzybowska, wS 25.I.2016) According
to Lisicki, it is explainable by means of historical differences. Eastern Europeans have
directly experienced the totalitarian rule,  including Nazi and Soviet terror. Therefore
they are skeptical about attempts to try to enforce in our days allegedly related ideas.
Westerners  however  are  not  aware  about  the  inevitably  grim  outcomes  of  these
ideological  utopias.  (DR 10.XII.2017,  4)  In  any  case,  Poland  is  a  „last  bastion  of
freedom” in Europe and „therefore, independently on if Polish government cope with
always well  or not,  defending Polish sovereignty is  the same as defending classical
understanding of freedom and Western civilization”. (DR 10.IX.2017, 3)
These ideas chime well in with the long tradition of Polish national conservative school
of thought with its emphasis on Polish divine mission in saving Europe. If the open
conflict  with  European Union has  changed anything,  then  probably  the  faith  in  the
feasibility of the mission has diminished. So Marcin Wolski speculates that on the one
hand the success of Poland, Hungary and possibly other states may well lead to the
overall conservative awakening in Europe. On the other hand however „only one thing
is alarming: that in time of trial of the clash with genuinely Christian civilization the
false elites [of Europe] choose Islam.” (Wolski DR 6.VIII.2017, 54)
In turn for Paweł Lisicki the pressure experienced by Poland during the controversy of
the rule of law had shown that European Union had changed considerably since the
Polish accession. As it had allegedly been turned into „instrument of disciplining and
punishing the  non-conforming16,  a  big machine  with  which  it  would  be possible  to
realize utopian objectives”, he muses about the idea of leaving the European Union.
(DR 10.XII.2017, 4) This is the only detected reference to the hard Euroscepticism in
the analyzed articles, showing also despair in attempts to find common ground with the
Western European “Other” (cf. Lisicki 2017).
16 niesforny – literally naughty, unruly
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3.2.6. Other frames
Very rarely  it  is  supposed that  the  European side  may have  sincerely  believed that
Poland genuinely had troubles with the rule of law. Exceptional are two interviews with
German MEP Hans-Olaf Henkel.  He agrees with the suggestion of interviewers that
Germans are behind bringing the rule of law controversy to the international arena, but
rejects the view commonly held by the Polish right, that they further their economic
interests or desire to enhance their power. Rather according to him post-war German
generations tend especially due to the Nazi past feel obliged to show their high morality:
“The reasons should be searched in the years 1933-1945. From that time on German
politicians  are  as  though  overtaken  by  the  “syndrome  of  the  helper”.  They  must
demonstrate and prove that today they are better people. And so Germans are saving
climate in the world, saving Euro currency, three times saved Greece, and now it was
the turn to give Poland some tutorial lessons in democracy”. (GP 13.I.2016, 10, cf. DR
25.I.2016, ) Also prof. Czaputowicz seems to think that at least some actors in Europe,
while still biased towards Poland, sincerely believe that they are fighting for the right
cause.  Therefore  evidence-based  efforts  to  convince  them  would  make  sense.  (DR
6.VII.2016, 63)
Also it is often hinted to the personal bias of certain leading EU politicians and officials
towards  Poland  as  a  factor  influencing  their  attacks  against  Poland.  As  mentioned
above, this  may be explained by referring to their  personal,  institutional  or national
interests as well as their ideological convictions. In some cases, the motives are not
however clearly specified.  Most often are as personal enemies of Poland mentioned
Frans Timmermans, Guy Verhofstadt and Martin Schultz, while attitudes toward Jean-
Claude  Juncker  are  more  ambivalent.  Also  German  chancellor  Angela  Merkel  and
French president are occasionally mentioned as influential politicians whose bias toward
Poland may play a role during the conflict.
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Finally it should be noted that in some articles about the rule of law crisis no attention is
paid to its causes at all. Notably former prominent politician of PO Jan Rokita discusses
in  several  occasions  the  course  of  the  events,  being  often  scathingly  critical  of  the
tactical  decisions  the  PiS  government  had  made  in  defending  Polish  interests.  He
himself identifies with Poland in the confrontation with the EU. However Rokita avoids
any judgements about who is right in the debate or why the conflict broke out in the first
place. (wS 26.I.2016, 43-44) 
3.3. Key remarks
According  to  Polish  right-wing  media  the  outbreak  of  the  rule  of  law  crisis  and
launching article 7 procedure against Poland was linked to opposition of the European
political  actors to the electoral victory of the national-conservative PiS party and its
policies.  Almost  always  it  is  presumed  that  the  controversy  over  the  Constitutional
Tribunal  was  only  the  pretext.  Genuine  reason  of  the  “attack”  against  Poland  was
allegedly related to the fact that forming conservative government in Poland was seen as
contrary to the interests of different influential  actors or unacceptable in ideological
grounds.
Much more widespread are interest-related explanations. According to these, Poland is
perceived as attacked by domestic opposition, competing member-states of the EU, top
leaders of the EU institutions or “the Establishment”. It is common that these actors are
believed to co-ordinate their activities against Poland.
In about 40% of the articles there are some references to the ideological dimension of
the conflict,  but only in very few of them it  is  dedicated much space.  In this  case,
Poland is  usually perceived as attacked by the leftist/liberal,  materialist  and morally
degrading West.  The rhetoric  in  explaining the crisis  is  derived from Polish history
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(Targowica,  complicated legacy of Polish-German relations), populist and Eurosceptic
tradition  (confrontation  between  “the  people”  and  “the  Establishment”)  as  well  as
earlier  European  political  thought  on  the  essence  and  functioning  of  the  EU  and
preferred future direction of European integration.
Explanations  to  the  outbreak  of  the  confrontation  between  Poland  and  the  EU  are
diverse and sometimes contradictory. Above different frames are dealt with separately,
but in most of the articles various frames are used and combined with each other. One
may well conclude for example that both the Polish opposition, other members-states
and “Eurocrats” are behind the attacks, each following their own interests or ideological
convictions. There are widely different opinions which actors are more influential and
how  they  co-ordinate  their  activities.  Neither  is  there  any  coherent  and  systemic
explanation, how the crisis came about in the first place. Most evident contradiction in
terms is the fact that in some cases politicians who defend interests of their respective
nation-states are thought to be the masterminds of the attacks, while those who desire to
destroy  nations  and  nation-states  altogether  are  blamed  in  other  cases.  Even  the
interpretations of the same politicians or commentators may be inconsistent. So in one
point MEP Legutko argues that the European Commission is entirely dependent on the
will  of member-states,  while  in  an another  interview he suggests  that  the European
institutions have at least some independence. Paweł Lisicki in turn interprets the conflict
in one editorial as caused by diverging interests between Poland and Germany, but in
another as a thoroughly ideological confrontation. (DR 31.VII.2017, 3; DR 10.XII.2017,
4)
To  conclude  with,  the  outbreak  of  the  rule  of  law  crisis  and  launching  article  7
procedure against Poland was according to Polish right-wing media linked to opposition
of the European political actors to the electoral victory of the national-conservative PiS
party and its policies.  Remarkable is the fact that in Gazeta Polska there are very few
ideology-related  frames.  Otherwise  there  is  no  significant  differences  between  the
frames  which  are  used  by  different  magazines.  Also  politicians  and  political
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commentators of both journalistic and academic background tend to use similar frames.
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IV ANALYSIS OF THE IDENTITY PERCEPTIONS
The analysis of the articles has shown that the Constitutional Tribunal controversy was
framed by the Polish right-wing press either as an ideological conflict between Poland
and the West – or significantly more often – as an interest-related conflict.  Identity
issues  are  explicitly  dealt  with  mostly  in  the  articles  which  pay  attention  to  the
ideological  dimension of  the  controversy.  In  that  case  Polish  or  sometimes  Eastern
European  identity  is  contrasted  to  European  one.  In  the  context  of  interest-related
explanations  identity  topics  are  not  usually  dealt  with  in  length,  but  it  is  implicitly
assumed that actors are either self-seeking or following their national affiliations. As a
rule it is not even considered that also European identity may exist. In this  chapter,
portrayal of identity characteristic of different explanations of the crisis are analyzed in
detail.
4.1. Ideology-based explanations
West as the Other
European Union is there perceived usually as led by the “West” which is depicted as
fallen  under  “leftist”  secular  and materialistic  ideologies  which  have  brought  about
rootlessness, moral decline and complacency in facing the Islamist threat. “The West” is
arguably  trying  to  impose  their  values  and  ideologies  to  other  parts  of  the  world,
including Eastern  Europe.  The electoral  victory  of  conservatives  in  Poland in  2015
meant a serious backlash for them which prompted the attack of the West under the
pretext of Constitutional Tribunal controversy crisis. Poland is contrasted to the West as
a  country  which  has  remained  true  to  “traditional  values”  of  Europe  and  also  a
genuinely free country where everybody can use the freedom of speech unhindered of
“political  correctness”.  Notably,  Christianity  or  Catholicism is  often  seen  as  a  key
component of Polishness in contrast with the secular West.
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Such juxtaposition of Poland and Europe is very closely reminiscent of pre-accession
axiological debates, especially as it emphasizes attitudes toward religion and so-called
family values as important constituents of identity. (see e.g.  Styczyńska 2018, 72) On
the other hand, labeling the Western Europe leftist or „Neo-Marxist” seems not to have
been common at that time (cf. Góra and Mach 2010, Styczyńska 2018) and thus seems
to be influence of foreign right-wing discourse.  Anti-Islamic identity  talk in several
articles is most probably partially linked to the refugee crisis and   the issue of their
relocation  which got  much coverage  in  the  same magazines  at  that  time.  However,
issues  of  multiculturalism and alleged  Islamic  threat  were  discussed  already  earlier
(Frankowiak 2016, 379) The rule of law controversy seems however not to been added
any new arguments  about  the  differences  between Poland and the  West  at  all.  It  is
assumed that  the  understanding of  democracy and rule  of  law is  among the  Polish
conservatives similar to that of European main-stream and the judicial reforms comply
to the usual practice applied also in other member-states.     So the controversy is only
the  pretext  of  the  ideological  “Other”  to  get  rid  of  the  new  Polish  conservative
government,  representing  genuine  Polishness  (and  indeed  genuine  Europeanness).
(Wildstein, wS 26.XI.2017, 3)
Noteworthy are claims of some of the authors (notably Paweł Lisicki) that European
Union  has  profoundly  changed  since  the  time  Poland  joined  it,  becoming  more
ideological and oppressive. In fact, their negative portrayal of Europe is very similar to
that of the opponents of Polish membership during the accession debates. Presumably
the rationale behind these questionable claims is to mobilize those conservative Poles,
who so far have supported EU membership, behind the hard Eurosceptic cause. The
confrontation with the EU over the Constitutional Tribunal seems to have served them
as a good opportunity to highlight the alleged otherness of Western Europe.
All  in all,  othering of the Europe remains shallow, schematic and declarative,  being
limited often to enumeration of identity markers, which allegedly separate Poles and
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Europeans (see page 58). It seems to be based more on ideological constructions than
knowledge about European countries and personal encounters with their people. It is not
clarified  at  all  why  exactly  these  aforementioned  differences  between  Poland  and
Europe are so profoundly important to trigger the alleged deep ideological conflict. Also
are both Europe and Poland often treated as monoliths, not mentioning differences of
opinions in the societies.  Notably Poland is  described as a solidly Catholic country,
despite the fact that society is  in fact divided regarding the issue of the position of
church  in  the  society,  with  religiosity  gradually  declining  especially  among  young
people.
Also  findings  of  this  study  indicate  that  the  role  of  Catholicism  and  church  in
determining the political stances of Poles may be overstated. Notably, Catholicism or
Christianity  as  a  component  of  Polish or  European identity  is  mentioned only  in  9
articles dealing with the rule of law conflict with the European Union (about 1/8 of their
total number). Also, nowhere is it evident that religious convictions or feelings inspire
opposition to  Europe.  Adherence of Poland to Christianity  or Catholicism is  always
mentioned only in passing as an identity marker, as it seems, in order to highlight the
the otherness of Europe.
These findings do not comply with that of Bartosz Napieralski who claimed, based on
interviews conducted with leading politicians of the PiS, journalists and church leaders,
that  main  sources  of  Euroscepticism in  Poland are  Catholicism and concerns  about
national sovereignty (Napieralski 2017, 124-125). It is probable however that Catholic
component of Polish identity is much more salient for religious nationalist audience of
the media outlets of Tadeusz Rydzyk and to some extent that of main-stream Catholic
magazines such as Gość Niedzielny – both also among the supporters of PiS.
Eastern European identity
As indicated above, sometimes traits which are characteristic to Polish identity are also
attributed more widely to Eastern Europeans (meaning post-communist member-states)
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or specifically to Visegrád countries. It is noteworthy however that references to Eastern
European identity occur usually in two specific contexts. Firstly, it is argued that thanks
to assertive foreign policy of the new government has Poland prospects to become a
regional leader. The rationale behind such declarations seems to be boosting the national
pride of Poles, as their state, despite being sixth member-state by the population, has not
achieved comparable political weight in the Union. Thus imagined leadership of at least
a part of the Union would serve as a proof of success of the foreign policy of the PiS
government. (e.g. MEP Czarnecki DR 7.VIII.2018, 21)
Secondly, it is stressed that Poland stands not alone in the confrontation with the EU,
but has allies who have similar background and standpoints. Occasionally it is referred
even to alliances  in  more distant  history.  For example in  a  bizarre  comment Czech
hardline Eurosceptical MEP Petr Mach was praised for his vocal support for Poland and
his contribution to the alliance between the nations compared with that of Jan Žižka.
(wS 25.I.2016, 93) Non-surprisingly, especially strong support is often expected from
the side of Hungary.
Some right-wing commentators and thinkers cling to the hope that similar historical
experience  of  the  Eastern  Europeans  has  resulted  in  similarities  in  values,  too.
Especially it is noted that due to communist heritage they may be more resilient to the
indoctrination  of  the  leftist  ideologues.  Such  views  expressed  by  Lisicki  (DR
10.XII.2017) chime in with the statement of MEP prof. Ryszard Legutko: “the European
Union is becoming less and less European in the genuine sense of the term, and /.../ the
truest defenders of European identity are now to be found in Eastern Europe” (Legutko
2018)
However, survey evidence suggests convincingly that public opinion is very diverse in
different  countries  of  the  regions  on  virtually  all  of  the  issues  which  Polish
conservatives hold important. For example, people in neighboring Czech Republic share
suspicion of the Poles towards Muslims, but on the other  hand are overwhelmingly
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secular and supportive of gay relationships. (Religious Belief 2017, especially 27) On
the other hand the formation of Eastern-European block seem not to be feasible also due
to diverging interests of different nation states. (Zwolski 2017, 175)
Taking this into account, it seems that emerging of common Eastern European identity,
based on conservative values and common resistance to the domination of the Western
nations in the EU
remains  wishful  thinking  of  the  right-wing  Poles.  Not  genuine  sense  of  belonging
together with the  other nations of the region seems to be behind that, but rather seeking
reassurance  in  the  confrontation  with  the  EU or  dreams about  gaining  international
prestige  as  a  regional  power  of  Eastern-European  countries  willingly  accepting  its
leadership.  Essentially  such  a  vision  of  Eastern  Europe  is  for  the  Polish  Right  an
imagined  “Poland  writ  large”  as  an  alternative  to  the  western  version  of  European
identity.
Ideas about Eastern Europe as an entity based on common values with Poland as its
leader draw on projects of Międzymorze from the interwar period. Poland tried at that
time  in  vain  to  create  a  bloc  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  countries  which  was
however  motivated  mostly  by  security  concerns.  Similar  proposals  have  been  put
forward  also in  1990s,  albeit  by rather  marginal  politicians.  (Ištok & Koziak 2009)
Based on statements presented by some rightist political commentators (DR 10.IX.2017,
3), it seems that lasting confrontation with the EU institutions may lead to attempts of
revitalization  of  these  ideas,  this  time  linked  also  with  imagined  common  identity
claims.
If conflict over the rule of law is seen as an ideological confrontation between Poland
(or Eastern Europe) and the West, it may foster the image of Poland as the carrier of
authentic European heritage and missionary zeal to promote these in Europe. However,
as the West is seen at least once as the stronger part of the conflict, possibly capable of
imposing its will to Poland, it may also lead to strengthening of hard Eurosceptic views
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among certain right-wing circles in Poland. However the evidence is rather inconclusive
as  these  topics  are  dealt  with  in  depth  only  in  relatively  few articles.  It  should  be
emphasized  that  vast  majority  of  the  articles  about  the  confrontation  with  the  EU
mention the ideological differences between Poland in passing or not at all. The conflict
is presented there mostly as being based on diverging national and/or personal interests.
4.2. Interest-based explanations
Frames  which  explain  the  conflict  by  means  of  power  struggle  in  Poland,  in
international  arena,  inside  the  EU  institutions  or  between  the  citizens  and  the
Establishment,  all  see it as being based on diverging interests.  In doing so, political
actors are seen as either self-seeking or motivated by national identity. Virtually never it
is  taken  into  account  that  they  may also  feel  European and  pursue  the  interests  of
community of Europeans.
Opposition
In  articles  where  the  conflict  with  the  EU  is  interpreted  largely  as  the
internationalization of the domestic conflict, the Polish opposition seems to be usually
seen as a group of individuals who co-operate in order to retain or regain their personal
privileges and power, not caring about citizens and national interests of Poland. Their
exact motives are not as a rule described in much detail. Still, it is clear that their main
objective is to topple the PiS government. It would be possible for example if outside
pressure  would  generate  economic  difficulties  which  in  turn  would  lead  to  popular
discontent. (e.g. wS 25.I.2016, 3) However the harshest accusation to the opposition
politicians  is  that  they  have  abandoned  their  loyalty  to  their  homeland  and  have
descended to co-operation with foreigners.  It  is  presumed by right-wing media  that
national identity should be above all other identities. As government is currently the
representative of the Polish nation,  opposition should therefore avoid attacking it  in
international arena. Also Polish officials in the European Union are obliged to defend
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the interests of their home country, even despite the fact that formally they should avoid
it.  (see  for  instance  GP 20.I.16,  13)  In  other  words,  the   representatives  of  Polish
opposition  are  obliged  to  defend  national  interests,  but  are  putting  their  personal
interests  first.  This  is  what  differentiates  them  basically  from  the  conservative
government, not ideological convictions or social base.
Only once it is argued that differences between the political camps are related to identity
questions. Namely MEP prof. Legutko claimed that the activities of the opposition may
be explained also by the fact that they identify not with Poland, but rather with Europe:
“Regarding this phenomenon, a certain role is played by Union ideology. As we are in
the Union, the interest  of the Community is  also the interest  of Poland. Everything
happens in this big European family, therefore it is not a shame to revile the rightist
government, whose perspective is different. For some it is simply a moral imperative.”
(DR 7.VIII.2017, 17) It is however the only such an observation. As a rule it seems to
be self-evident in the Polish right-wing discourse that nation state is the only political
entity  an  individual  can  strongly  identify  with.  Even the  possibility  of  existence  of
European identity is often not discussed.
International power struggle
In case if the rule of law dispute is seen from the perspective of conflicts of interests
between  EU  member-states,  possibility  that  some  of  the  actors  may  identify  with
Europe is also never discussed. 
As already mentioned, the European Union institutions are in case of using this frame
fairly often seen as proxies of the influential member-states. Beside that it is presumed
that also European Union officials are using their position for promoting the interests of
their respective nation-states. For example Frans Timmermans is thought of keeping in
mind business interests of Netherlands in Poland. (DR 2.V.2016, 26)
There  is  only one  exception.  On January  19,  2016 Prime Minister  Szydło's  gave  a
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speech during the debate on Poland in the European Parliament, in which she mainly
tried to convince the deputies that the whole dispute over the Constitutional Tribunal is
based on misinformation on behalf of Polish opposition. Gazeta Polska presented the
report on the event under the headline “We defended our freedom and sovereignty” and
summarized the speech to its readers as follows: “Prime minister remembered also that
in several times Poles have spilt blood not only for ourselves, but also for other peoples
of  Europe,  and  such  values  like  freedom,  justice  and  sovereignty  are  for  Poles
inalienable  values.  “We  have  been  and  will  be  a  part  of  Europe,  the  Europe  that
develops, the Europe of equal opportunities. This is our future and so we imagine it,”
stressed Beata Szydło”. (GP 27.I.2016, 14) 
Not only this excerpt, but also the entire speech (Szydło 2016) seems to be carefully
designed  to  emphasize  Polish  European  credentials.  However,  as  is  openly
acknowledged by a Polish right-wing commentator, this identity statement should not be
taken at face value, but as a tactical move to alleviate pressure on Polish government:
“In contacts with the West – like always when it comes to the discussion with a stronger
partner from whom much depends on, it is reasonable to use the language, which at
least creates illusion that we share a common worldview with it, and all the argument is
only  about  temporary  misunderstandings.“  (wS  25.I.2016,  28;  cf.  Monika  Oboży's
opinion in GP 27.I.2016, 14)
Therefore the message of the prime minister seems at this occasion targeted mainly to
European and not domestic audience.  It  is  noteworthy that in her interviews for the
analyzed magazines she never makes similar claims. Very similar rhetoric which seem
to  deliberately  echo  Western  understanding  of  European  values  and  identity  was
however used also by prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki during the policy statement
speech of his new government on December 12, 2017 in the Sejm. (Morawiecki 2017)
Citizens vs the Establishment
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At first glance it seems that the elite which according to this frame is behind the attacks
against  Poland  may  consist  of  people  who  identify  with  Europe.  Indeed,  they  are
occasionally blamed for plots of federalization of Europe which according to users of
ideological  frames  (see  previous  chapter)  involves  the  conspiracy  against  national
states.  However,  it  seems probable  that  they  are  rather  acting  entirely  in  their  own
personal interests which are arguably in danger after the conservatives have taken power
in Poland.  As “the Establishment” is rather vaguely defined and their motives usually
not described, it is hard to judge. In any case, it is never explicitly stated that either
“Eurocrats” or other members of “the Establishment” feel European.  To the contrary,
according to MEP prof. Legutko the members of the „Establishment” identify strongly
with their home countries: „Governing establishment has his federalist project, which is
realized notwithstanding the victory of the Right or the Left. In general it is well known
who governs in this club, who has much and who has little to say. It is clear that few
western countries decide, the others have to adapt.” (wS 3.IV.2017, 73)
In  turn,  “ordinary  citizens”  or  “people”  may  be  treated  as  genuine  Europeans  with
whom also government supporters of Poland can identify with. However, this theme is
not elaborated in the analyzed articles.17 Statements that Poland is becoming a leader of
those Europeans who fight against “the Establishment” are not supplemented by identity
talk.  In  fact,  as  even  some commentators  in  Polish  right-wing media  admit,  in  the
confrontation with the European Union the most vocal support to the government of
Poland  came  from  “right-wing  plankton”  (wS  25.I.2016,  3),  who  have  radically
different views from PiS in many important issues and therefore clearly not “Us” for the
Polish conservatives either. Notably they tended often to be hard Euroscepticists. (DR
25.I.2016, 34)
17 However, such line of thinking is represented in some of the articles which deal not with the rule of 
law crisis. In one of these Tomasz Sakiewicz argues: „If it seems to somebody that he outplays the 
nations of Europe, building supranational non-democratic power, he should meet solidaristic social 
resistance. If Europe belongs to anybody, then rather to us, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, 
Rumanians, Bulgarians, Brits, Scandinavians and many others than Angela Merkel and Martin 
Schultz.” (GP 20.I.16, 2)
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Power struggle within the European Union
Generally  it  is  presumed that  the actions  of supranational  actors are  explainable by
means of personal or institutional interests, primarily gaining power. Only very rarely
identity-related issues are mentioned in case of dealing with their motivation behind the
attacks against Poland. One example of this is the following reasoning of prime minister
Szydło: “The point of view shared by this group is more and more evident: we have
problems,  institutional  predicaments  and migration  crisis,  which  we are  not  able  to
solve. So let us find a scapegoat, whom to lay these our problems. It would be the best,
if  these  would  be  countries  of  Central-Eastern  Europe  which  are  relatively  young
members of the EU, have different views than we, the Old Union, to many issues. What
is  more,  these  countries  demolish  the  order,  the  peace  and  quiet  which  we  have
achieved.” (PM Szydło, GP 1.VI.2016, 6)
Here prime minister attributes to the EU decision-makers sense of feeling together on
basis of being the citizens of the old member-states while the Eastern Europeans are
treated as the Other. As a rule however, no discussion about European identity occurs at
all also when the frame of power struggle within the EU is used. It is presumed that
people  in  European  Union  institutions  simply  attempt  to  enhance  their  personal  or
institutional power. They need not even to have bias against Poland or its conservative
government, but try to take personal advantage of the crisis.
4.3. Discussion
The study has shown that ideas from recent and even distant past about Polishness and
Europeanness are surprisingly relevant for right-wing Poles, who, embarassed about the
peripheral position of their homeland in Europe, tend to see European politics as a zero-
sum game of nation-states. Alternatively they may hope to compensate their allegedly
secondary status by sense of moral superiority or ambitions of becoming the regional
leader for Eastern Europe.
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The  evidence  presented  in  this  chapter  shows  however  also  that  Polish  right-wing
commentators remain divided over the question to what extent European integration is
related to identity questions. Similarly to the preaccession debates Eurorealist ideas are
still prevailing and the European Union is mostly seen as based on intergovernmental
interest-based  co-operation.  In  that  case  identity  questions  are  not  relevant  and  the
European identity in particular is not a salient topic. There are some exceptions, one of
them concerning a speech of the prime minister Szydło which was mainly addressed to
the foreign audience. However, in overwhelming majority of the articles not only sense
of belonging to Europe is never declared by the right-wing commentators themselves,
but even the possibility of its prevalence among other people is not considered. It is in
accordance with the findings of Anita Frankowiak that right-wing opinion magazines
tend to overestimate importance of national identity among Europeans while overall
questioning  the  feasibility  of  construction  of  European identity  which  is  sometimes
referred as “artificial” (Frankowiak 2017, 288-290).
However, some authors also represent the view that the controversy with the EU has a
strong  ideological  aspect.  In  that  case  also  identity  differences  between  (Western)
Europe and Poland are more or less highlighted. More often it is hinted to alleged anti-
Polish bias of European actors, but sometimes even the whole conflict is described in
terms of confrontation between peoples representing two incompatible value system. In
that case “Europe” is seen as the “Other” while the rhetoric used is reminiscent of the
opponents of Polish accession about 20 years ago.
From the European Commission side the dispute about the Constitutional Tribunal was
however presented as being about values. Furthermore, western politicians and media
have often treated Poland as the “Other” while dealing with the topic18.  Hence it  is
remarkable that  Polish right-wing media framed the  conflict  more  often that  not  as
interest-driven. Probably it has to do with the fact that most of the right-wing political
18 More on that, with relevant references see Nougayrède 2018
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actors are trying to take advantage of the benefits the EU is offering for Poland and are
therefore not interested in escalating the conflict. In case conflict is seen as being rather
about interests than about values-based identities, it would obviously be easier to reach
compromise agreements which would not put in danger the future of Poland in the EU.
The interpretation of launching the Article 7 procedure primarily as a part of domestic
and international power struggle may seem unconvincing for an outsider, but has for
right-wing  Poles  still  offered  opportunities  to  make  sense  of  the  ongoing  events.
Therefore there has been no need for looking for alternative ideas which might in turn
facilitate identity change. It has to be added that slow pace of the rule of law procedure
and low probability of imposing the sanctions against Poland may have also contributed
to this.  At  the beginning of  the  confrontation with  the EU Polish right-wing media
followed the procedure closely and some commentators seemed to be rather anxious
about the outcome. (DR 25.I.2016) However, as nothing serious appeared to follow, the
interest in the subject diminished. If the European Commission would have been more
assertive and decisive in its actions, it may well have caused different reactions also
from the  side of  Polish  right-wing media,  leading possibly  for  a  “critical  juncture”
needed for identity change.
However, the study has also shown that the construction of European identity may be
more complicated than previously thought. Understandings about how the EU functions
and attitudes towards Europe varied remarkably, even though all of these may described
as variations of soft Euroscepticism. Even the emphases of the same commentator may
vary across the articles. It may indicate that in the case of Poland also views about
European identity are still not fixed, but prone to change easily due to changes in the
political environment. Importantly, prevalence of the identity talk may also depend on
particular context. In many other articles in the same time period on other European
issues ideological frames seem to be used more frequently. For example, it is possible
that a study dedicated to the repercussions of migration crisis of 2015 in Poland would
lead to the different conclusions on European identity than this study (cf. Krzyżanowski
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2017). Also it is evident that politicians disseminate very different identity messages to
different audiences.19
Finally, clear distinction should be made between collective identities, constructed by
the  elites  and  disseminated  by  means  of  media,  and  individual  identification  with
Europe.  Identity  construction  in  the  individual  level  may  follow  the  cues  of  the
politicians and the media, but at the same time be highly incoherent and inconsistent.
For example, focus group research show that many Poles echo right-wing rhetoric about
sovereignty and “Europe of nation states”. (Góra 2015, 124) At the same time according
to Eurobarometer data overwhelming majority of Poles (59% against 31%) agree that
“more decisions should be made at EU level” (Eurobarometer 2018, 170). Also the trust
towards  European  Union  institutions  of  Polish  citizens  remains  higher  than  toward
Polish parliament, government and political parties. (Eurobarometer 2018, 42f, 92f). So
even though the findings of this study tend to confirm the conclusion of Zdzisław Mach
that so far Poles tend not to identify with Europe almost not at all (Mach 2017, 22), it
may well be that in the long run obvious benefits of the EU membership prompt Poles
to shift their loyalties to the supranational level as Ernst Haas once predicted. (Risse
2010,  15)  In  any  case,  it  may  make  even  now harder  for  right-wing politicians  to
construct the European Union as “the Other” of Poland.
19 In December 2017, after being nominated the prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki told in an 
interview for ultraconservative religious TV station TV Trwam that he dreamt about re-
christianization of Europe: http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114884,22758869,mateusz-
morawiecki-ma-ambitny-cel-chcemy-rechrystianizowac.html, retrieved December 1, 2018. Some days
later, during the presentation of the program of his government in the Sejm, religious rhetoric was 
almost avoided by him. Instead, it was emphasized that Poland is a European country with a long 
tradition of democracy and tolerance. (Morawiecki 2017)
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Conclusions
Multiple  crisis  which  have  hit  the  European  Union  have  profoundly  changed  the
scholarly research on European studies, raising interest in the study fields of European
identity and Euroscepticism. Especially events in Central and Eastern Europe have been
cases in point. Notably the rise to the power of the national conservative government in
Poland in 2015 have lead to several conflicts with the European Union. Among the most
important  of  them  is  the  controversy  over  Constitutional  Tribunal.  As  the  Polish
government  refused  to  acknowledge  the  rulings  of  the  Tribunal,  the  European
Commission decided to launch Article 7 procedure, citing the violation of the rule of
law as one of the basic values of the EU.
The aim of this study was to find out how European identity issues were dealt with in
the  context  of  the  controversy  by  the  Polish  right-wing  media.  Following  Thomas
Risse's theory about Europeanization of national identities, it was presumed that open
confrontation  with  the  EU  about  a  values-related  issue  might  influence  the  ways
European identity was portrayed in the media, leading potentially to an identity change
among the supporters of Polish right-wing government. In order to find it out, all the
articles dedicated to the controversy in the right-wing opinion weeklies (Gazeta Polska,
Do Rzeczy and wSieci) from the years 2016 and 2017 were analyzed by means of frame
analysis.
According to the findings, the controversy was almost never dealt with as a meritocratic
dispute,  but it  was perceived instead as a pretext for an attack against Poland. Two
different approaches to the causes of the controversy may be discerned. According to
the first approach, the conflict was in essence interest-driven. In most of the articles it
was assumed that Polish opposition contributed to the provoking of the controversy,
hoping  to  resume  the  power.  According  to  the  other  popular  explanation,  the
controversy  was  about  sovereignty  and  economic  interests,  with  influential  member
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states trying to impose its will  to the government of Poland. Sometimes it was also
assumed that  vaguely defined “Establishment” of the European Union is  behind the
controversy or struggle for power in supranational institutions of the EU plays a role in
it. Importantly, no explicit identity talk was usually used in the context of interpreting
the conflict as interests-driven. Implicitly it is assumed that the behavior of actors may
be explained either by referring to personal or national interests. Almost never is even
assumed that one can also identify with Europe or the EU.
According  to  the  second  approach,  the  controversy  was  essentially  an  ideological
conflict, caused by the fact that leftist and secular Western Europe cannot come to terms
with the fact that their ideological opponents had gained power in Poland. In case of this
approach identity talk is often used. One of the main constituents of Polish identity is
considered to be Catholicism or Christianity, other identity markers include attitudes
toward homosexuality, abortion, nationalism and multiculturalism (especially regarding
the Muslims) and occasionally gender issues, environmentalism and the like. Western
Europe is thus seen as the “Other”, representing alien and potentially dangerous values
for Poland. In several occasions, similar values to Poland are attributed to the wider
region (Visegrád group or alternatively all post-communist member-states).
As expected, ideas and narratives of the past are often used in interpreting the current
events.  Importantly,  interest-based interpretations of the crisis  seem to resonate with
Eurorealist  approach, based on intergovernmental vision of the European integration
without  stressing  identity  aspects.  Ideological  interpretations  resemble  however
axiological  and  identity-based  hard  Eurosceptic  views  of  the  accession  debates.
However,  both approaches are often combined by several authors,  which sometimes
leads to incoherence and obvious contradictions.
Against  the expectations,  the rule  of  law controversy did  not  bring any remarkable
change to the perceptions of European identity among right-wing Poles. However, if
possible future conflicts with the EU would rather be constructed by the right-wing
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opinion leaders as being based on ideologies and values rather than interests, it would
prompt possibly more Poles to perceive “Europe” as the Other and lead in turn to the
surge in hard Eurosceptic views.
Regarding the importance that identity issues play in the future of European integration,
it is therefore necessary to continue research on European identity both in Poland and
elsewhere. In case of Poland, studies should concentrate on how statements of identity
vary in other particular contexts. However, the findings of this study are relevant also in
the context of wider European identity studies. Namely it has shown that it may have a
profound importance whether a confrontation between the EU and a member state is
framed  as  interest-based  or  ideological  (values  based).  Further  research  would  be
needed to find out,  if  it  may have indeed impact  on the support  level  of European
integration and strength of European identity.
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Janecki
Brukselskie strachy na lachy
EU power struggle
Divided opinions
Prestige
Distraction
Ideology
Left-liberal
WS Nr 27, 4.VII.2016, 72-73
Grzybowska
Żeby już nie było tak, jak było
International power struggle
Economic interests
International standing of Poland
WS Nr 30, 25.VII.2016, 36-37
Janecki
Dostali „Czarną polewkę”
Ideology
Left-right
EU power struggle
EP
WS Nr 31, 1.VIII.2016, 77 
Grzybowska
Niech  się  pan  nie  rozpłacze,  panie
Timmermans
Ideology
Left-right
Christianity/Catholicism
Multiculturalism
Establishment
WS Nr 38, 19.IX.2016, 17
Cywiński PiS musi odejść!
Internal power-struggle
Opposition as initiator
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
International power struggle
Economic interests
German hegemony
WS nr 38, 26.IX.2016, 108
Łaniewska
Kornik Drukarz
Internal power-struggle
Opposition misinforming Europeans
WS 13.II.2017, 7
Karnowski, Szydło
Polska gra w pirewszej europejskiej lidze
International power struggle
International standing of Poland
Establishment
Eurocrats
Internal power-struggle
Opposition misinforming Europeans
WS Nr 9, 6.III.2017, 95
Jachowicz
Z listów do Timmermansa. Przebudzenie
Internal power-struggle
Opposition misinforming Europeans
Personal bias
Timmermans
WS Nr 11, 20.III.2017, 95
Jachowicz
Timmermans nie odmówi
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
WS Nr 14, 3.IV.2017, 52
M. Karnowski, R. Legutko
To my bronimy Europy
Internal power-struggle
Opposition as initiator
Establishment
Federalist project
International power struggle
East-West
WS Nr 27, 3.VII.2017, 28-30
Waszczykowski, Karnowscy
Odnosimy sukces i świat to widzi.
Internal power-struggle
Opposition misinforming Europeans
Competition
International power struggle
Germany hegemony
Ideology
Liberal-conservative
WS Nr 28, 10.VII.2017, 94
Grzybowska
Co zrobić z „tą Polską”?
Ideology
Liberal-conservative
Political correctness – freedom of speech
Christianity/Catholicism - secularism
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
WS 13.VIII.2017, 91
Makowiecki
Tajny plan Brukseli?
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
International power struggle
Sovereignty/independence
Postcolonialism
Personal
Timmermans
WS 27.VIII.2017 Internal power-struggle
Janecki
Plan ofensywny przeciw Polsce
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
International power struggle
Sovereignty/independence
Unspecified interests
WS 10.IX.2017, 20-22
J. and M. Karnowski, Szydło
Ten szantaż się nie uda
Establishment
Spillover
International power struggle
International standing of Poland
Sovereignty/independence
WS 26.XI.2017, 3
Wildstein
Potępienie Polski
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
Establishment
International power struggle
East-West
WS 26.XI.2017, 79
Reszczyński
Szok, ale nie bezsilność
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
Ideology
Left-right
Liberal-conservative
International power struggle
International standing of Poland
Sovereignty/independence
Personal
Timmermans
Verhofstadt
WS 22.XII.2017, 34
Skwieciński, Saryusz-Wolski
Unijne gonienie króliczka
Internal power-struggle
Opposition as initiators
Distraction
EU power-struggle
Distraction
DR Nr 1, 10.I.2016, 34-36
Semka
Rok mocnych wrażeń
Ideology
Left-right
Liberal-conservative
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
DR Nr 3, 18.I.2016, 14-17
Baranowska, Lisicki, Szydło
Nie zrezygnujemy z naprawy Polski
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
International power struggle
Sovereignty/independence
Intergovernmental power-struggle
Economic interests
EU power-struggle
Distracting
Federalization
EC ambitions
Divided opinions
DR Nr 4, 25.I.2016, 14-17
Semka
Nie zrezygnujemy z naprawy Polski
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
International power struggle
German hegemony
Ideology
DR Nr 4, 25.I.2016, 64
Wolski
Głupota działań niepotrzebnych
Establishment
Eurocrats
Ideology
Left-right
Internal power-struggle
International power struggle
Regional (V4)
International standing of Poland
Sovereignty/independence
Postcolonialism
Ideology
Left-right
DR Nr 4, 25.I.2016, 16-22 
Ćosić, Henkel
Sankcje dla Polski. 
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
Ideology
International power struggle
East-West
Federalization
German hegemony
DR Nr 8, 22.II.2016, 27-29
Pieczyński, Krasnodębski
Odparliśmy szturm
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
Opposition misinforming Europeans
Ideology
Traditionalism
Political correctness – freedom of speech
Liberal-conservative
International power struggle
West-East
International standing of Poland
Personal bias
Prejudices
DR Nr 14, 4.IV.2016, 85
Rybiński
Apel do ludzi bez honoru
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
DR Nr 16, 18.IV.2016, 23
Baranowska, Kolonko
Merkel mogłaby Szydło wiązać buciki
Ideology
Liberal-conservative
International power struggle
Intergovernmental power struggle
Personal
Verhofstadt
DR Nr 18, 2.V.2016, 24-26
Czaputowicz
Trybunał Niekonstytucyjny.
International power struggle
Economic interests
DR Nr 21, 23.V.2016, 3
Lisicki
Utrzeć komisarzom nosa.
International power struggle
Sovereignty/independence
Intergovernmental power-struggle
Internal power-struggle
Echoing
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
DR Nr 21, 23.V.2016, 5
Wybranowski. 
Awantura po uwagach Komisji Europejskiej
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners 
Ideology
Political correctness – freedom of speech
International power struggle
Sovereignty/independence
DR Nr 23, 6.VI.2016, 28-29
Semka
Nie zaznacie spokoju
International power struggle
Sovereignty/independence
Intergovernmental power-struggle
EU power struggle
Internal power-struggle
DR Nr 27, 4.VII.2016, 62-63
Czaputowicz
Polska Pollacka
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
International power struggle
Sovereignty/independence
Personal bias
Prejudices
Convictions
DR Nr 37, 12.IX.2016, 62-63
Czaputowicz
Kłamstwo konstytucyjne
Ideology
National – cosmopolitan
Liberal - conservative
International power struggle
Intergovernmental power-struggle
Internal power-struggle
Opposition misinforming Europeans
DR Nr 40, 3.X.2016, 27-29
Makowski, Krasnodębski
Nikt  nie  mówi,  że  Polska  wszystko  robi
idealnie
Internal power-struggle
Opposition as initiators
Personal
Verhofstadt
Ideology
Traditionalism
Christianity/Catholicism - secularism
Liberal-conservative
DR Nr 43, 24.X.2016, 78-80
Ćosić, Schöpflin
Polska znalazła się na celownika
EU power-struggle
EC ambitions
Personal
International power struggle
Intergovernmental power-struggle
East-West
Ideology
Left-right
Human rights
DR Nr 3, 16.I.2017, 
Makowski, Czarnecki
Unia to jeszcze nie „Titanic”
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners?
DR Nr 2, 9.I.2017, 30-31
Warzecha
Co nam zrobi UE
Establishment
International power struggle
East-West
Personal
Convictions
EU power-struggle
Personal
DR Nr 31, 31.VII.2017, 3
Lisicki
Szaleństwo komisarzy z Brukseli
International power struggle
Sovereignty/independence
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
DR Nr 31, 31.VII.2017, 11
Warzecha
Timmermans może nam skoczyć, ale...
Internal power-struggle
Opposition misinforming Europeans
Personal
Convictions
DR Nr 31, 31.VII.2017, 31-33
Wybranowski, Legutko
Syndrom targowicy
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with the foreigners
Opposition as initiators
Opposition misinforming Europeans
Personal
Prejudices
Timmermans
Verhofstadt
EU power-struggle
EC ambitions
DR Nr 32, 7.VIII.2017, 16-19
Makowski
Atak pośredni
Internal power-struggle
EU co-operating with foreigners
DR 32, Nr 7.VIII.2016, 20-21
Zboralski, Czarnecki
Polska  prowadzi  własną  grę  i  to  niektórych
Internal power-struggle
Ideology
Left-right
boli Liberal-conservative
International power struggle
International standing of Poland
East-West
Intergovernmental power-struggle
DR Nr 32, 7.VIII.2017, 3
Lisicki
Mój senny koszmar
International 
Sovereignty/independence
Intergovernmental power-struggle
Internal power-struggle
Opposition co-operating with foreigners
Ideology
Feminism
Genderism - traditional values
Multiculturalism
Antiracism
DR Nr 32, 7.VIII.2017, 54
Wolski
Dylematy brukselki
Ideology
Multiculturalism
Christianity/catholicism - secularism
International power struggle
Economic interests
DR Nr 49, 10.XII.2017, 49
Lisicki
Nie do takiej Unii wchodziliśmy
Ideology
Left-right
National-cosmopolitan
Environmentalism
Genderism-traditional values
Christianity/Catholicism-secularism
Appendix 2
Diagrams
1. Distribution of the articles across the magazines and in time (number of the articles)
2. Frequency of frames used (number of the articles)
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